The Dartmouth College
Library
Has purchased this Book
from the Income of the
SANBORN LIBRARY FUND
Established by
EDWIN WEBSTER SANBORN
of the Class of 1878
In Memory of
EDWIN DAVID SANBORN
of the Class of 1832
for many years
Professor of Belles-Lettres
and sometime Librarian at
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Discarded by
Dartmouth College Library

THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS PUBLICATIONS
WILLIAMS COLLEGE, WILLIAMSTOWN, MASS.

APPROACHES TO WORLD PROBLEMS

OTHER INSTITUTE OF POLITICS PUBLICATIONS ISSUED BY YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCES OF THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AT ITS FIRST SESSION 1921

THE RECENT AIMS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN. BY RIKITARO FUJISAWA, PH.D.

THE PREVENTION OF WAR. BY PHILIP KERR AND LIONEL CURTIS

GERMANY AND EUROPE. BY COUNT HARRY KESSLER

THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER MODERN DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONS. BY DE WITT C. POOLE

THE GREATEST EXPERIMENT IN HISTORY. BY SIR EDWARD GRIGG

APPROACHES TO WORLD PROBLEMS

BY

THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD

GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS

PHILIP HENRY KERR

NEW HAVEN

PUBLISHED FOR THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS

BY THE YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON · HUMPHREY MILFORD · OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MCMXXIV

Discarded by
Dartmouth College Library

Copyright 1924 *by Yale University Press.*

Printed in the United States of America.

APR 12 1933
325703
Gen.

34/.04
B534ap

PARTMOUTH
COLLEGE
RARY

FOREWORD

The Institute of Politics presents these three addresses in the hope that they may be of interest to serious students of international affairs. The addresses which make up this volume illustrate three different methods of approach to the fundamental question of peace.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Problems Left by the Great War By the Earl of Birkenhead	3
World Relations in Their Bearing on International Peace and War By General Tasker H. Bliss	25
I. World Problems of To-day	75
a. The World in Which We Live	75
b. How the World is Governed	82
c. Africa and Asia	88
d. The Problem of Europe	96
e. Peace Plans of To-day	100
II. World Law and World Peace By Philip Henry Kerr	107
Index	121

PROBLEMS LEFT BY THE GREAT WAR

BY THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
FORMER LORD CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN

PROBLEMS LEFT BY THE GREAT WAR

It is, I think, indisputable that the present mischiefs in the world can only reach, if they can in any way reach, a solution by discussion and debate. For without discussion and debate action not only cannot be helpful: it may be positively injurious. The methods and the conscientious, laborious, and sustained efforts by which such discussions are carried on here seem to me to reproduce in a modern age somewhat the principles upon which in ancient days the Socratic dialogues were founded.

Now I propose to indicate to you at the outset the method which I may most helpfully pursue, if indeed it is in my power to give you any assistance at all in relation to the topic which I have chosen. I am conscious that everything that is ideal must have been dealt with, and probably far more fruitfully, by the extremely competent and experienced experts who have been debating these topics for, I believe, no less a period than a month. And it would not be creditable either to their originality or to their industry if they had not in a month produced far more sound and instructive wisdom than can possibly be in my power to reproduce in an hour, even if I had enjoyed the benefits, which I have not, of listening to their discussions or of reading them.

I propose, therefore, with your good will, to attempt in the first place a short series of generalizations upon the subject which I have chosen—namely, Problems Left by the Great War. After I have attempted that short series of generalizations I shall

ask your attention, not, I hope, for too long a period, to some more particular observations which I shall ask leave to make upon some of those problems which seem to me to be the gravest and the most difficult. I am well aware that the subject which I have chosen must involve me in a controversy. Indeed, I am told that even in the harmonious and quiet and charming atmosphere of this town you have not been able at times entirely to expel the controversial element from the discussions which have preceded my entry into this arena.

While, therefore, I must treat certain matters in a way which is not only controversial, but perhaps acutely controversial, and with an appearance of dogmatism which can never be avoided when curtailment is imperatively required by the occasion—while, I say, I shall try as far as possible to avoid either an unduly partial statement of that which I hope to indicate, or an unduly dogmatic method of presenting it, I am conscious that no human ingenuity could avoid this double risk.

I will, if you will permit me, make a few observations first as to an earlier stage of the problem which now demands our attention; for, though the stage is earlier, the problem is the same.

The circumstances amid which the Great War arose were astonishing enough. About twelve very unscrupulous but very powerful men decided, sitting around a table, that there should be war. They deliberated very privately in Berlin. Many cool observers in the world had doubted whether there would be war. I did not happen to be among the number. But there was much to be said for their view;

in fact, there was almost everything to be said for it; for no one charged with the destinies of Germany could pronounce for war unless, besides being an extremely unprincipled, he was also an extremely ignorant man. For Germany, given peace, had everything in her own hands, and her principal trade competitor in Europe was likely to be paralyzed by internal dissensions relating to Ireland, which might easily have produced civil war. All Germany had to do was to wait. But, none the less, these twelve narrow, ignorant, arrogant men pronounced in favor of war. Their decisions psychologically had only to consider a weak monarch and a Crown Prince disloyal to that monarch. They triumphed, and from their triumph proceed the devastating consequences with which we and our children, and perhaps our children's children, must reckon for the rest of our and their lives.

The problems of the war were incalculably great; but they were small indeed compared with the problems of the peace. It took ten years to recreate the structure of European society after the Napoleonic wars; and the exhausting expenditure, material and vital, upon those wars was as nothing compared with that of which it is our duty to make a cool analysis.

It is no use abusing the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty was the creature of the victorious mood of the victorious allies. It is quite easy now to say that more moderate terms could and ought to have been imposed. The answer is complete. Human nature being what it is, no victorious nations could have reconciled with the determination of their democracies terms less severe upon a defeated enemy who had deliberately and wickedly, for motives of national aggran-

dizement, run the risk of submerging the whole of Western civilization. President Wilson, indeed, came with a noble message of hope; but unhappily, in the sequel, hope proved to be his principal equipment. It is a fascinating speculation whether, had he been given health and strength to pursue the campaign which he contemplated, his idealism and personality could have affected the forces of the world. I am bold enough, even at the moment when I pay the highest tribute to his unselfish and courageous motives, to doubt it. For the real truth is that, while the whole world requires the encouragement and the light of idealism, the whole world would probably not survive if idealism were given a completely free play. The same simple, illuminating, if cynical, truth applies to that hideous competition in the world by which every individual who does not inherit a fortune is confronted. The great Bentham long since pointed out that the motive spring, and the necessary motive spring, of human endeavor is self-interest; and he equally pointed out that the consequences would certainly be obscure and, in his judgment, unfortunate if every individual began to regulate his life, not upon his own interests, but upon some supposed interest of others. And, indeed, a very cautious mind might stagger before such a possibility. No creature in the world—human, animal, or, it might also be added, vegetable—has ever regulated his, her, or its life upon a basis such as that under consideration. And when it is considered that the world has already lasted for some millions (or billions) of years, and that countless billions of billions of breathing creatures have inhabited this world during that period, an experience so unanimous and so entirely unaf-

fected either by Christianity or by civilization, at least affords to a scientific observer the material for an irresistible generalization.

And the same great truth applies equally to nations. No nation in democratic conditions will ever be allowed to become the knight-errant of the world. The governors of each nation are the trustees of the whole people; and, unhappily, they are removable trustees. They must always keep pace with the beneficiaries of the trust because the beneficiaries in this particular matter can at any moment discharge them from their offices. And therefore it seems to me that, while the name of President Wilson must always be revered by those who render homage to purposes almost superhuman, pursued with a zeal almost as superhuman, yet it must none the less be recognized that his judgment of his own countrymen was wrong, and that by the error of that judgment he became, paradoxically enough, the agent of all those post-war developments from which his altruistic mind would most specially have recoiled.

I, for myself, have no delusions as to the only function which the American government is called upon to discharge. Their primary, and indeed their only, duty is to the American people. If by intervention in the affairs of a stricken Europe they can advance the fortunes of the American people, then it seems to me, as an humble observer, that it would be their duty to make such an intervention. But if in cool perspective they reached the conclusion that no compensating gain to the American people would result from reassuming European and world responsibility, they would be failing in their duty if they embraced an unnecessary responsibility.

This, and this alone, is the problem of the moment. Who shall marshal the arguments? The most acute and learned political dialectician in the world might fly from the task in despair. And, indeed, the great economists and financiers of the world have in the last four years proved little able to afford us sound guidance or even accurate prediction. Who is there to-day who has appreciated the complete economic consequences of the accumulation of so much gold in America upon the export trade of America? Who is there who can tell us clearly over how long a period the immense domestic market of the United States will be adequate to the immense manufacturing resources of your great cities? Who has yet convincingly analyzed, in relation to the devastating problems of modern exchanges, the effect of a high tariff system? Who has accurately measured the effect upon the agricultural community of the United States of the existing and artificially produced economic conditions? The farmers of the Middle West have long, in my understanding of American history, been among the great figures of your ordered community. They have been efficient; they have been industrious; they have been conservative in the non-political sense in which all reasonable men see praise in that adjective. Are the present conditions of the world favorable, or even tolerable, to them? Are they likely to improve? Are they affected by the present condition of the world? Can they be permanently alleviated while the conditions of that stricken world remain unchanged? If I am right in supposing that the deflated condition of Europe as Europe is to-day already affords grave anxiety to your agricultural community and may in the future occasion an equal and analogous anxiety

to your manufacturing community, I have at least established all that I care to establish: that grave and not very remote problems await the decision of the American nation.

For myself, I have never varied in my view. Great nations not only deserve, but require, a great world in which to develop their own greatness. Commercial genius flourishes when the whole world flourishes; and its prospects decline when the whole world declines. Shipping, invisible exchanges, interest on money borrowed by stable creditors—these are the garnered rewards afforded to the thrift and financial efficiency of the nations which are happy enough to possess those qualities. But if you substitute for the conditions which existed before the war a world in which there are no markets for anything which you or we can produce, because hardly anyone in the world can afford to buy at the present rate of exchanges that which you and we—both manufacturing nations—can produce, then sooner or later your experience must be the same as ours. The manufacturing genius of your nation is great; so is the manufacturing genius of ours. To-day we are suffering more than you in our manufacturing, if not in our agricultural community, because our home market is smaller than yours. But if and when your home market ceases to employ in their fullest energy the resources of your manufacturers, the resultant position, combined with the existing agricultural situation, will bring you almost precisely to the position which to-day we feel. Nor will gold reserves help you. Nor have they very much helped any people in the world. The strength of the world lies neither in gold nor in precious jewels; it lies in the ordered and

peaceful industry of great populations harnessed to those occupations by which, in the imperfectly defined purposes of the Author of the universe, all alike must earn their living. And the genius of great peoples, while we maintain our present economic systems, will find its reward in extricating a world of suffering, not unwilling to work, from its present morass, and in releasing and reanimating the economic forces which, and which alone, can bring prosperity to the body politic and economic of the whole world.

I indicated that I should precede the more particular observations I have to make by a series of generalizations which, because they must necessarily be brief, must equally necessarily be bold, and it has occurred to me that it might interest you if by way of some particular illustrations I expressed a few general conclusions as to the situation of several of the most important nations in Europe at this moment. And at least I make this claim with boldness: that if I err, if I do too much justice to one country and too little justice to another, it is not because I am not making a sincere and honest attempt to see the situation as the situation actually is, excluding as far as I can exclude all national, all emotional, and all cosmopolitan prejudice from my mind. Let me, then, so far indulge the egotism of an Englishman as to select first for consideration the case of my own country.

The generous admission of the American nation has been freely given that England made sacrifices in the Great War of which I am content to state, in the moderate words of the great American, that they were sacrifices worthy of the martial history of that

country. I need not recall to you the loss of life, almost comparable to that sustained by France, which has destroyed forever the hopes of so many English homes with an anguish comparable to that with which the Angel of Death enters alike the palace of the great and the home of the humble in your country. Still less do I speak insistently tonight of the treasure, collected painfully and industriously over centuries, which we flung without a thought and without a question into the common cause.

But I would ask your attention to the situation in England as we see that situation to-day. We have balanced our budget. We have not shrunk from a sustained stringency of taxation comparable at least to that by which you yourselves are crushed at this moment. For that reason, our credit is high; we have followed—I know not whether we have followed too closely—the hard and painful road to deflation, rather than the easy primrose path to inflation; and by an incorrigible habit which our country has pursued through the centuries, which I think has not, perhaps, been without some resultant and compensating advantages to our credit in the world, we are paying our debts. And this we have hitherto done whether we borrowed the money for our own consumption or for the accommodation of a friend who at that moment was in a difficulty. But such is our situation until I come to make a very brief observation on the subject of reparations. If I was right—at any rate, the great majority of the victorious nations will agree that I am right—in making the claim that this war with all its staggering cost in blood and treasure was forced by a guilty country upon a reluctant world—if that claim be not too bold, it fol-

lows plainly and unarguably from it that, quite apart from the financial aspect of compensating those who were the innocent victims of an aggressive war and who sustained ruinous and devastating consequences in their financial affairs—it follows that, quite apart from that consideration, for the mere warning of nations in the future, the price paid is and must be heavy.

But here, unhappily, the position of Great Britain is not especially favorable, because to us it sometimes seems as if almost all the world except ourselves lived in a world of which the general atmosphere proceeded from a series of very astonishing illusions. It has sometimes seemed to us that there is a general view, certainly held almost universally in Europe, that such is the simplicity of the British character that that nation can be relied upon not merely to adopt a course, so far unimitated by others, of paying its just debts, but that we are also to forgive everyone else, whoever he may be, everything that he may owe us, whatever the cause of that indebtedness is. To such an assumption, however gratifying to the reputation which our country has established in history, however eloquent of the practical application which, almost alone among the nations, we are supposed to be capable of making and have made—to such an assumption there are, I assure you, quite a considerable number of persons in England who are not able to subscribe.

For let me indicate to you, by way of illustration, what the consequences would be. But first let me give you, as I can do in one or two simple sentences, the general continental atmosphere to-day.

First of all, it is always assumed in Germany that

"We shall have to pay something to France; we shall have to pay something to Belgium; we may have to pay something to Italy; but, as a general accommodation, it may surely be assumed that Great Britain will waive her claim." Well, whether there will be much to waive as the particular part of Europe develops, might be made a subject of curious controversy, and I do not pursue it now, but rather pass to another source from which we might hope to obtain something: that is to say, from those allies who have taken a somewhat different view of sound finance from our own in the last four years and on whose behalf we guaranteed indebtedness during the years of the war. Well, their view of the matter seems to me to be an extremely simple one. It is: "Well, it is quite true that, in a pedantic business sense, you may say we owe this money to you, but pedantry is one thing and sentiment and realities are quite different things, and you really couldn't ask us to pay you." I assure you that is the general posture that is adopted in Europe. Well, supposing we yield to it, with the additional attractive indications as made—that if and when Germany pays a sum of money which everybody who is not in a lunatic asylum knows Germany can never pay, "if and when she pays us in full, then we shall be delighted to pay you what we owe you." I should have been a much richer man if I had been able to regulate my own small matters of indebtedness upon a somewhat similar basis. In fact, only the other day I observed that an eloquent and well-known writer in a French paper said quite plainly, "Our debts—our debts—our debts are the scars of the war." Well, of course, that is one way of looking at the matter. I rather wish it

had occurred to us. We hadn't quite thought of it in that way.

Another writer, this time an Italian writer, in an article which was brought to my attention about ten days ago, made the following illuminating observation. He said, "We are told that Great Britain is going to forgive us our debt to her." Who told him, I do not know. A year ago we should have welcomed the assurance, but now it has been so generally acted upon that it ceases to cause us any particular excitement.

Observe, then, where my unfortunate country is. We are not apparently to receive anything from the German reparations. We are not able to draw any considerable checks upon that bank in which is kept an account for the scars of war. We are, as it is our wish and was always our fixed intention, for the reasons I have given—reasons historical and inherent in the character of our people—to pay our own debts. We have not laid and do not propose to lay any complaint whatever; but in what situation will that leave us? If these gloomy apprehensions are acquiesced in, they will leave us in this condition: that we, who, after all, were not more conspicuously defeated than another nation, are the only nation that is really paying indemnity unless Germany pays some. Well, it is surprising, after the rather remarkable efforts we made during those four years. But if this be the result, it must be the result.

Now, that is the train of thought that is passing through many British minds. Let us see whether or not I can apply my judgments with equal impartiality to what I conceive to be the French view. For many years before the war France was bullied and

humiliated by Germany in the face of the whole world. Instead of resting content with the striking and public victory which culminated with the transference to Germany of the province of Alsace-Lorraine, the bungling diplomacy of Germany, foolishly apprehensive in an expectation of strength in Russia, neglected no occasion by which it might remind France that she had been a defeated, and in the judgment of Germany was still incomparably the weaker, nation. The legacy of bitterness and resentment which had been left by the campaign of Sedan deepened and intensified with the result of a brutal and insensate diplomacy. And so you came to this war—a war which incontestably (as far at least as we are concerned) we no longer propose to reargue, was forced by Germany upon France. A considerable part of France was devastated; inconceivable savageries were perpetrated in obedience to the doctrine of so-called horribleness. And at the end France undoubtedly feels, and in many ways quite rightly feels, that Germany has not paid what Germany could pay, and that a deliberate attempt is being made by subterranean manipulations of the paper currency to produce a bankruptcy which may indeed be official, but which has no correspondence with the actual and ultimately really valuable resources of the people, measured in their material possessions and their organizing power.

Such is the French conception, and there is, of course, a great deal to be said for it. There is a great deal to be said for the view that you should obtain the maximum amount which is payable by Germany without impairing her capacity to pay anything at all.

I was myself opposed to the French occupation of the Ruhr, because neither you nor we have anything to gain by any further readjustments of the political situation in those districts. The only interest that we have in that situation—and you still retain some small financial interest—is whether or not the step which she is taking is one which is likely to produce a larger reparation; otherwise the matter does not concern us.

The French, however, went into the Ruhr; and the moment they went in, I have always quite plainly maintained, they were committed, and the flag of France was committed with them, to making the experiment. And I myself see no means whatever which are within our power to adopt or which it would be conceivable that we should adopt or that we can to-day avail ourselves of, in order to terminate that experiment. We may agree or we may disagree, but the French are in the Ruhr, and it is by the development of the situation which has been produced by their occupation, and by that development alone, that it will be shown whether they were right or whether we were. But we may be allowed solemnly to notice that whatever other compensating advantages—if there be compensating advantages—have flowed from the occupation of the Ruhr, the greater prospect of Great Britain obtaining general reparations has hardly been afforded.

I would now, if you would allow me, make a concluding observation upon the subject of Germany. I have not hesitated to state quite plainly my conception of the primary and the proximate responsibility for the terrible war, the memories of which still, in their poignancy, throng our minds. But, while

I make that observation, there are certain circumstances which require to be borne in mind. For the correction and the warning of those who may be tempted in the future along the promising road of international crime, it is necessary to remind them that a nation cannot escape responsibility and cannot evade punishment by pointing to its government and saying that it and not the nation is responsible. If such a plea were ever admitted, the jurisprudence of a nation and the decisions of war would prove to be equally nugatory. Such a claim cannot be admitted. But a distinction must of course be drawn between the case of a democracy and that of a nation which lived under an autocracy, which had no real voice in its own government, which was powerless without a revolution to control the foreign policy of that government, and which found itself with easy promises of swift immediate material aggrandizement launched upon the road which it had trod itself in previous historic campaigns. A distinction, I think, in justice must in this respect be drawn between a democracy which has deliberately maintained and supported a policy, and the nation upon which that policy has been imposed. The distinction must not be exaggerated nor its consequences magnified, but that there is such a distinction I do not doubt. And I have no doubt there are many in Germany to-day, honest men, particularly of the middle classes, who have seen every farthing which they possessed dissipated while the mark joins the ruble in its devil's dance; men who had no more responsibility for the war than you and I had. I can conceive of many such thinking that there are respects in which they have not perhaps been afforded a real

chance of making pecuniary reparation without involving themselves in complete ruin.

Well, now, the first ground upon which, if I were a German standing before you tonight, I should base a plea, not indeed for reconsideration of the major decisions, for those decisions are irrevocably taken, but at least for some degree of consideration and perhaps of reconsideration, would be this: You must tell a people, if you are going to involve them in the payment of immense sums of money—you must tell them, not a fanciful figure which you state for the purposes of the impossible axiom, but you must tell them in real terms which you mean and are able to enforce, the amount which they have to pay, and it must be an amount which, conceivably at least, they can pay. And therefore I, for one, and I think all English people, warmly welcome a proposal, of which I believe Secretary Hughes was the author, that a commission should be appointed in order to determine the amount which Germany could pay. But the unfortunate part of that suggestion, at the moment when it has been pressed for the adoption of the French nation, is that it has come when they are committed to the Ruhr experiment, and when in consequence they are almost logically committed to maintaining the authority of the Reparations Commission, whose principal and primary function is to solve this very question: namely, what Germany can pay.

I tried to keep myself, in stating the case of England, in the position of an Englishman, not anxious to be partial or unfair, and to state the world situation as it strikes and must strike him; and he knows that the direct consequence of the condition of

Europe is the unemployment which has grown and grown in all our great cities and which seems likely to reach even a more somber climax in the approaching autumn. Such, I think, would be the general view of the ordinary Englishman trying to state the position fairly and clearly.

I have tried to put myself in the position of a French citizen standing here and charged with the same duty before this great meeting. I hope that the respects in which I made it plain that I found myself unable at some stages to agree with the policy of the French Government, have not made it impossible for me to appreciate the feelings which have operated in their minds or the bitterness and resentment which have led them to so many conclusions.

And it is equally our duty to try to see what points there are, if there be any such points, which can be fairly placed before a reasonable conqueror by a nation which has been defeated. I cannot eliminate from my mind any more than you can eliminate from yours the uneasy situation of various great financial figures in Germany who have been enabled by transfers of capital and by the conversion of paper into solid and more durable assets, and for their own purposes, to produce some of the amazing consequences which have recently marked the downward fall of German currency. I cannot say whether the situation and these charges—for they are openly made—are ill-founded, but I should not exhaust the possibilities which are entertained as to the actual situation in Germany if I did not remind you that by a well-informed section of European opinion these views are commonly held.

That which I had to say to you is concluded. Who

can doubt that I use moderate language when I say that the war has bequeathed to Europe perplexing and, it may be, ruinous problems? Great Britain cannot indefinitely support the burden of unemployment which has involved us, and necessarily, in my opinion, involved us, in the payment over so many years of such gigantic sums. To us it is necessary—for we are neither self-supporting nor primarily agricultural—that we should replace the markets that we have lost or cease to maintain an industrial population upon our soil.

The gravity and difficulty of this problem has not been diminished by the circumstance that our population has grown on a scale so surprising as it has done since the war. France has her problems. Germany, of all others, has her own. Is there any ray of hope which at this moment can be presented? That an alleviation shall be found in the near future, I neither claim nor ask nor hope, but only that some remedy may be discovered in a period of three or even five years. I should not deal honestly with you if I concealed from you my own conclusion that, unless some change unforeseen by me, unforeseeable by me, occurs in the present situation, all Europe must grow progressively worse.

We can indeed, no doubt, modelling ourselves upon your exceptional geographical situation and resources, more and more deflect British credits into our own dominions and extend and encourage our colonial markets. We can more and more reassert the British policy of isolation, sustained for so many centuries teeming with great historic events. We can say to Europe, "Continue if you will the ruinous courses to which you are committed: the British

Empire will appeal to its own people, will develop its own markets, will concentrate its finances and its own resources upon its own dominion." And yet it is a part which I should myself be sorry to see to-day. A tragic moment comes when nations who trod together so many years the bloody road of death, who breathed so many years the black air almost of despair, say at the one moment when the battle be won after so much struggle and so much endeavor, "We carried that task through; the larger, the greater task of statecraft that remained, we have recoiled from in mutual estrangement."

I still hope and I still believe, though I am not bold enough to express this feeling in terms of time—I still hope and I still believe that all the nations who saved civilization, which would have been destroyed, will one day realize and convince themselves that not merely the interest of Europe but the individual interest of every great country in the world requires that some common effort shall be made to alleviate and correct the misery under which Europe is groaning to-day and before which Europe may so easily succumb. Then not only shall be won the greatest war in history, but our names will be remembered and acclaimed by generations to come as those of the men who were not unequal to a nobler task—that of winning the greatest peace in history.

WORLD RELATIONS IN THEIR BEARING ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND WAR

BY GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS

WORLD RELATIONS IN THEIR BEARING ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND WAR

When I was honored by an invitation to address this Institute of Politics it was suggested that an appropriate theme would be something like this: "European Conditions in Their Bearing on the Possibility of Reasonable Disarmament." It seemed to me, after reflection, that these very conditions so absorb the question of disarmament in a more fundamental one that the former must now be treated as incidental to the latter. If considered now by itself, the general statement covering it must be, in brief, that so long as present conditions continue disarmament is impossible. And so long as there is no disarmament in Europe it will be difficult for important parts of the rest of the world, like the United States for example, to disarm further or so far cease preparations for war as they might otherwise be quite willing to do. It is in Europe that the conditions exist for war such as might possibly and gradually drag into its maelstrom the rest of the world, as it has done before. So long as those are the conditions I do not see how any citizen of such a country as this can advocate unpreparedness to meet the results that may very possibly flow from them.

And it seems to me that the brief explanation of the impossibility of disarmament in Europe under present conditions is the fact that the peoples and rulers of many nations, big and little, are feeling that the charter of their existence as independent states is at stake in the Treaty of Versailles. So long as

that feeling persists there can be no independent European public opinion that can be brought to bear on the real merits of a dangerous controversy between any two of them; because, whatever be the settlement, it may find each of them fighting "for its own hand" to secure a new and unquestionable charter of its independence. We may think that this danger is problematical and, in any event, remote; but the fear of it, reasonable or not, is immediate and pressing, and it is that fear which we must note.

Therefore, I have modified the subject that was first proposed for me to discuss. European disarmament is incidental to international relations on that continent. Those relations are incidental to world relations. The part of the latter which the United States has with the rest of the world—for no amount of repetition of the parrot-cry of "isolation" can do away with the fact that we have such relations—necessarily has some effect, make it as little as you choose, in continuing or in modifying for better or worse these world relations with their bearing on international peace and war.

You will further note that I begin my remarks with certain conclusions. These derive, I think, from what I conceive to be historical facts, however much their origin may antedate recorded history. They are briefly these:

In the slowly organizing state, the individual found that his isolation was lost and that he must seek safety in some other way. He found that the only alternative to isolation is association. He also learned that association was ineffective without co-operation and that this required the assumption of certain duties and obligations, each towards the

other. These duties and obligations made necessary the surrender, by mutual concessions and little by little, of primeval rights. This mutual concession of primitive rights was the origin of law and all civilization.

But, curiously enough, the recognition of this necessity of association and coöperation, out of which has come all the progress of the individual man, proceeded very slowly after the individuals became welded by contact into states. For ages these states have made sporadic efforts to substitute association and coöperation for isolation; and out of these efforts has come all that we have of law governing the relations of states—International Law—just as out of similar efforts between the individuals within the state has come our much more complete system of domestic law. And the great question which the world must soon decide is this: Is there any other line of continuous progress in determining the proper relations between states than the one which has determined and permanently fixed those relations between the individuals within the state?

Lord Grey recently said, "If we do not learn from the past, we perish." It seems to me that any exercise of right reason on the facts of the past leads infallibly to certain conclusions.

The first one is that pretty much all that has proved to be good in the life of man has come from the practical operation of the spirit of association and coöperation.

In the second place, this spirit did not grow out of any altruistic considerations, but from observation of the fact that, on trying every way after physical isolation ceased to be a fact, this was the only

one by which they could attain the, in one sense, selfish object of individual safety and prosperity. But, after all, it is not selfishness in the repugnant sense of the word. Man has always determined what was good for himself by a consideration, first of all, of self. His advance began as soon as he reasoned on the fact that he was not the only self in the community; that what was good for him might in the long run prove the best only when he admitted his fellows to a share in it. That kind of selfishness guided by reason is altruism in practice. It is on that kind of selfishness of man that my hope for the future is based—selfishness guided by common-sense business principles. That will make him see that the gain of nations, as well as of individuals, is in proportion to the like gain by all others; and that this, with nations as individuals, depends upon the control of instinct by reason. In a small way, even the cave man learned that. It was an ancient philosopher who said that man is a reasoning animal. And he taught that man raised himself above the animal that is in him in proportion as his reason led him to put checks upon his brute passions; and the man who did this put himself on a plane whence he looked down on other men, while he beheld the gods themselves face to face, on a plane level with themselves.

The third conclusion is that states still cling, in varying and perhaps in lessening degree, to the character of relations that the individual civilized man long since rejected as intolerable; that they place their hopes of safety in isolation when isolation has ceased to be a possible fact, and are still dominated by the spirit of ignorance, suspicion, and fear that grows out of isolation.

It may be that the lesson taught by domestic life within a state—and it is true of all of them—the advantage of association and coöperation, is not applicable in the relations of the states themselves. If we accept that, we may as well accept at the outset the fact that, just in proportion as it is inapplicable or is not applied, we shall continue to have the great wars that mark the historic periods of retrogression. Absolute isolation of the individual means savagery; in proportion as it is maintained in the relations of states these will be characterized by outbreaks of international savagery in which the peace, safety, and prosperity of all concerned may be lost.

There is no thoughtful writer of the day, who tries to project forward the light of history, who does not express this general view. Doubtless it was the view of Lord Bryce in the very last sentence that he uttered before this Institute not very long before his death. Having in mind the fact that the mechanical arts of our civilization have outstripped the spirit of it; that however much that was good war had saved in the past, the time had come when it might easily destroy more than it saved; that in its course the tribes of Africa and Asia would be enlisted for hire or serve under compulsion, using implements they could never have devised themselves, to help our civilization to hurt, perhaps destroy, itself, he spoke of war as the deadliest of all the evils that afflict mankind. And, dead, he appeals to you now as he did then for "your help, your powerful and disinterested help," which, he said, "will be of incomparable service in every effort to rescue your brother peoples" from this evil.

As to those three conclusions, I do not see how any-

one can get away from them, for they are not merely conclusions from facts but are facts themselves. Now, unless I stop there I am led to the fourth conclusion —that as every other method has been tried, to secure the safety and prosperity of states against external violence, with such results as history tells us, there is nothing left but, in some form and in some degree to begin with, coöperative association. And that requires the declaration of a specific object and definite rules agreed upon to attain it.

If that conclusion is in any degree correct, if we must make our choice between anything like that and the former relations between states, then truly "Civilization is standing at the cross-roads." Is she waiting for us to lead her in the right path? Some say, in effect, "We will let her choose the path and then follow her gladly"; but she has never yet taken any path that man did not blaze the way for.

But those conclusions, by themselves, get us nowhere. Those who accept them do so because they believe that under international relations as they have existed every method for preserving the integrity of a state against external aggression, for enabling its people, should that be their real desire, to develop their own national life, pursue their own ideals, enjoy the fruit of their own labor without the fear of any man—all the resources of honest and dishonest diplomacy, alliances of the weak until they threaten the strong and then alliances of the strong, the growth of armed preparation until every agency of peace is in time of peace partly, and in war almost entirely, diverted from its legitimate purpose, so that in peace are borne many of the burdens of war —all these methods have been tried, with the historic

certainty of ultimate failure and a resulting temporary, perhaps, but longer and longer paralysis of all the forces of civilization—except charity. Nevertheless, the conclusions are steps along a path that leads to a blank wall. The path, rough as it has been, is the only path of progress that we know of; we have more reason to believe than not, that if we can continue in it there will be fewer stumblingblocks and pitfalls; yet civilization remains camped at the foot of the wall waiting for time and the elements to dissolve it, making no manful effort to climb over it or dig under it or break a way through it.

The influences that operate on the human mind to check progress in the direction we are considering are an important element in the problem that must be solved. The problem is twofold and is nothing more than this:

Is it possible to put the relations of states on a more common-sense business basis than heretofore by getting them to do jointly and without limitation of time what they sometimes do individually by treaty for a limited time—i.e., make certain mutual concessions with the surrender in some degree of the so-called right of independent action (which, on last analysis, means nothing but the right of each to do as it pleases except as restrained by the fear of superior force); or, if they insist on the full retention of the right of independent action, will they make such concessions in the matter of their preparations to exercise it as will minimize the chances of their hasty resort to it?

One of the influences that are obstacles to progress in the path we would go is the unreasoning fear of great masses, of the unknown. It is especially dan-

gerous to themselves and others in gregarious animals, of which man is one. We speak indifferently of the stampede of a herd of cattle or of an army corps. Always ready to yield to its influence, it comes upon them only at times. The masses of people within a state are sometimes like that. Alarmed by meaningless signs about them, they follow the first leader who yields to his fear and who leads them perhaps into the very danger they dread while they flee from what meant them no harm. There is always the unfortunate possibility that in the human mass the leader may only pretend fear, knowing his power to start a panic-terror that will follow at his heels wherever he chooses to lead. And the most serious thing is that when this panic-terror is aroused in a people their tendency, while it lasts, is to follow no leader who does not yield or pretend to yield to the common fear.

Another obstacle to progress is in the fact that many men, very often the leaders of the masses, the very ones who should be most subservient to their own reason, refuse to follow it to its conclusion; or, rather, they refuse to take the step to which the conclusion leads. I don't care by what process those who hear me reach their conclusions, but I doubt if there will be many differences in them. If we may judge from the published views of students of history, of statesmen, of social and political economists of all the world, they have pretty much all reached the same conclusion. A distinguished publicist said to this Institute two years ago: "The world can not be left where it is now. If the peoples do not try to destroy war, war will destroy them." But, even if we reach such a grave conclusion as that, when we

reach it we stop. Reasoning may often lead to a conclusion while only the empirical method can determine the application of it. And that, in fact, is the real difficulty that confronts us. We are all of the same conclusion; but we are afraid to continue with the empirical method; or, rather, we insist upon the impossible—that it shall cease to be empirical and that we shall know in advance that our first trial will be completely successful. Then we throw the decision into the maelstrom of party politics. Men selected to decide important domestic questions must decide an all-important international one as a side issue. They are in a dilemma between the conviction of their own reason on the one hand and unmeaning but influential party slogans on the other. Then we find how truly Lowell said in one of his Essays that "In politics a dilemma is a more unmanageable thing to hold by the horns than a wolf by the ears."

Another obstacle arises from certain natural, inherent characteristics of democracies. And the principal nations that we have to consider in the study of our problem are essentially democracies. A great mass of people, each individual engaged in the daily struggle for the requirements of life, is unable to look far beyond the problems of the moment. It is the things that will better their lives for to-day or to-morrow that they have most in mind to do. During the Great War, for example, the problem of what to do to prevent or minimize the chances of its recurrence seemed very immediate and pressing. But nothing could be done till the war was fought to a finish. Then came the many pressing problems of readjustment that you know of. The peoples said: "We must attend to these first. But we will never

forget the one great lesson of the war; as soon as we can get around to it, we will take that up." But the mass never gets around to it. Day presses on the heels of day, each bringing its problems which, by reason of nearness, loom bigger than the gravest problem of humanity which stares them in the face from a distance. A few years ago the man on the street, the farmer at the plough-tail, knew all he needed to determine his judgment on this matter. Now, to revive even a faint impression of those days, he has to get out his histories, if he has them. The tears of women and children are dried up; the reek of blood has disappeared from the air; kindly nature has covered up many of the scars that then seemed to be of mortal wounds and may still be, for all they are covered up. We see maimed and hobbling forms and interest ourselves a little in figuring out the sum that their maintenance will have cost at the end of fifty years. A maimed and hobbling civilization with the scars that deface so much of it, moral and material, that was a little while ago so beautiful to look upon and think about, is a vanishing picture. We are beginning to think it is quite enough to thank God that she is still alive. Already the problem of the next war is looming up as a pressing one of the moment.

Again, there is another characteristic of democracies which is perhaps the great obstacle to wise, reasoned change. It is the unyielding, no-compromise spirit the moment any question appears to the popular mind to involve any degree or sort of a moral issue and the tendency of intense party feeling to convert what are really business questions into moral ones. The government of a democracy must be by

party. There are no alternatives but anarchy or despotism. We have already seen governments of party that have degenerated into governments of many groups. The government is supported by a combination of opposing interests. They are united on the principle that each will support what it does not believe in, in order to get support for something that the others do not believe in. None can gain anything except by selling itself to the others. Important measures, if passed at all, may be carried by a minority of honest conviction. Through that sort of anarchy lies the road to despotism.

On the other hand, parties, though politically more honest, are more stubborn and unyielding. Two of them, each of many million adherents, are never united within themselves on all the important questions that must be decided. Experience shows that the rank and file of a party may be largely united in their conviction on some question and yet long remain disunited in their action. The spirit of party, in time of peace, is not to combine in the consideration of an important measure and all vote on their individual conviction regardless of political lines; but to wait until one can force its will upon the other. The spirit engendered causes a question thus settled to remain unsettled in spite of a majority. And this is the spirit most of all to be avoided when a democracy has to pass upon an international question.

Another obstacle in effecting change, one which I have just touched on, is in the attitude of so many persons who think that the relationship of states, instead of being a business question, is a moral one. They are convinced that no change for the better is possible until a great moral reform affects nations

as it may individuals. They know that the great mass of individuals within a state may have consciences that are accurate guides in the distinction between right and wrong in their personal relations, perhaps even strong enough in themselves to compel them to do the right and abstain from the wrong, whereas the state itself may do the most unmoral things, behave in the most conscienceless way. And they seem to think that it can not be expected to act in any other way until the state-entity has developed a conscience of its own, like that of the individual, perhaps, but in some mysterious way separate, and bigger, and acting more powerfully on the mass, enabling and compelling it to recognize and do the right. But we do not find much evidence of the developing individual conscience as a serviceable guide in man's relations, except in proportion as developing law guaranteed his safety, regardless of whether his neighbor's conscience was as good as his own or not. The moral conscience of states as a faculty enabling them to see and do the right will develop in the same way only as they find by experience that their safety may be secured in some other way than has hitherto been found necessary.

But there are many men who reason on the experience of history who say that nations have always been, and are now, in some sort of association with each other, that out of it has come all such progress in friendly relations as has been made, and that no other is needed. It is true that nations have been in some sort of association ever since their numbers and extent brought them into contact either by physical juxtaposition or by the necessity and means of more or less intimate communication. The trouble

with their relations in that kind of association is that they have always attempted to maintain their safety as against each other by the means first adopted by the individuals within a state when they began to come into close contact by increasing numbers. Their relations are those of the individual in an unorganized crowd where each man has to look out for himself. So, this so-called association of nations has been too much that of a crowd of growing numbers swaying backward and forward; the big ones pushing heedlessly right and left, impelled by their separate motives, colliding with each other, trampling on the smaller ones—because, like all crowds, it has no definite, uniform purpose, no definite rules agreed upon for its attainment. The fact that at intervals of time we can measure, notwithstanding all the lost or even retrograde motion, some positive movement in the right direction is a thing quite as much to be wondered at as to be pleased with.

You may say that we have a definite rule in international law. One half of that law relates to the rules of conduct in the relations of states when they are at war with each other; the other half contains many of the seeds out of which war grows—all because, on last analysis, each state, unlike the individuals within it, is its own judge and interpreter of the law. All effective law requires a sanction, a constraining principle—something which impels to conformity to a duly rendered judgment. The sanction to a law is either remuneratory, a reward for obedience; or is punitive, a penalty for infraction. In private law it is easier to impose penalties than to grant rewards. Nevertheless, in the life within a state the vast majority of its people, who obey the law and therefore

incur no penalties, find that they have a great reward, a material one in dollars and cents that they can almost take note of in their statements of profit and loss, due to the simple fact of their obeying the law. It took them some ages to learn that, and their law grew gradually as they gradually learned that. And it has now become the sole reason why the vast majority of individuals, without any appeal to the ultimate physical force which waits behind the law, obey it. In public or international law, the most difficult sanction is the imposition of penalties. Yet few men discuss any definite form of international association without maintaining, at some point, that its successful operation depends on the sanction of penalties. My own opinion is that it is an error to base an initial organization on that assumption. An association of states, very possibly the present one, will become successful in proportion as its individuals learn by experience that, by making a trifling mutual concession to-day, another one to-morrow, they are preserving longer and longer a new relation that is profitable for them; then they will find that they have the remuneratory sanction to their law.

Finally, as to this point, there are many who deny the fourth conclusion that I have reached and say that we have not tried all other methods than coöperation or that the methods that have been tried are in the long run good enough. What one has not been tried and how have they proved good enough? Let anyone take a map of Europe as it was after the dissolution of the Roman Empire; let him follow it from generation to generation until he finds any one state that seems to him to be about what it should be, judged by his own standard of right as to area

and population. Then let him follow its history to our own time, if it survived so long. It will be, most likely, a story of constant wrong and injustice both received and inflicted by it; gaining and losing by violence and, if it perished, perishing by it. Yet during those hundreds of years it was employing every method of diplomacy, alliances, and war to protect itself against its neighbors, as they were employing them to protect themselves against it. I do not for one moment mean to say that during that time international coöperation was possible. But that was the result so long as coöperation was impossible.

Assuming that it is still impossible, let us follow in imagination the history of some similar state now existing. Perhaps—I do not know—there is someone here present who took part in the formation of new states in Europe after the recent dissolution. There may be one in whose ultimate fate he is especially interested, for whose people he has an affection, and who, he thinks, have just about what they should have to develop their own national life. If he assumes world relations to continue as they have, and as he looks forward over generations to come, can he see, in the blazing light of history, any other fate than has met so many in the past?

He will have to prove that like causes will no longer produce like results, or else he must believe that in the future there will be some different rule of conduct for nations—and any generally accepted rule of conduct means helpful association and cooperation.

The men who made the treaty that gave these states their charters believed that, if world conditions remained as before, these charters were written

on water. I think that even the most cynical of them must have thought that whatever else he was doing he was also doing something to put a check in the future on international lawlessness. Otherwise he was like the man in the old Greek story who threw a handful of nuts among the monkeys, he throwing this handful of states upon the stage of the world for the world to quarrel over.

Those are some of the obstacles that have materially checked progress along the line that development has followed. They operate strongly in all nations, regardless of the character or degree of their civilization. If they have to be surmounted in all of them at the same time we might well regard it as hopeless. But I think we may find that they are like a series of hurdles and that we can take them one after another.

The world relations, in regard to which we have noted some obstacles to change, are a complex growing out of the foreign policies of the states concerned. In any one state its foreign policy is partly compelled by those of other states towards it, and is partly voluntary, so to speak, growing out of its own domestic policy. And, here, it is well to note that a large part of the world, by reason of its lesser advancement, or the sparseness of its population, or its relative poverty (notwithstanding great potentialities of wealth), is subject to the influence of relatively few states whose advancement in science, population, and wealth gives them a certain domination. In one sense, therefore, the problem becomes somewhat simplified; because, if the relations of these relatively few states can be in any degree bettered, it means a gradual betterment for the world.

And this dependence of so large a part upon a relatively small part of the world is a reason why the problem of bettered future relations is such a grave one, since war between two such dominating states tends to spread through the rest, large and small.

It is impossible to draw a clear line between the domestic and foreign policy of any state. The latter largely grows out of the former. If any state could be asked what is the inspiring motive of its domestic policy, it would doubtless say that it is designed to secure internal peace, security against external aggression, and prosperity for its people. To secure these three conditions of national life the large states, and some smaller ones, have practically fixed an ideal to work for, and it is now one of the most important of domestic policies. This is nothing less than to be entirely self-contained, self-sustaining. In reality, it is what the biologist would call a tendency to revert to the ancestral type of primeval man. It was only he or the modern savage who is, in this sense, self-contained. If it were possible for all states to attain this condition, the resulting form of our civilization would be an interesting subject for speculation. What would be the effect on the civilization within a state were it possible for every individual to supply all his wants without the intervention of anyone else, with a loss of the humanizing sense of interdependence? Certainly we should have to discover some as yet unknown motive to inspire and regulate conduct or lose much that is noble in human attainment. But states that have this ideal, in any degree, do not want it to be attained by others. They want to sell, but not buy. That is the process of the bargain counter. But between states buying and sell-

ing is trading of products. Whenever a new product is found a new want is created. The condition created of interdependence is thus self-perpetuating. This ideal as to material, economic matters is impossible of realization. Therefore states at first limited it to independence of others in the supply of material of war. Then it became increasingly apparent that it further required independence in food supply. We know now as never before the very grave importance of this sort of independence. To-day, in wars not between armies but between nations in arms, defeat or victory begins at home behind the battle-lines. It was the universal blockade by land and sea, cutting off all outside sources of food, of clothing, of all the elements of economic life, which, more than anything else, defeated Germany. Could her men above and below military age, her physical defectives, her convalescents from the armies, her women and children, have worked in physical comfort, well fed and well provided for in every way, her annual contingent of young men of eighteen years of age would have largely replaced the losses of war. This might have continued for several years. Her power would have remained not far from its maximum; this maximum, of course, would, at the best, have remained stationary, but to break it would require new accessions of military force on the other side. As it was, we learned that the moral force of a nation, as so often with individuals, is most quickly broken by continued physical privation.

This domestic policy soon develops into foreign policy. If the state is largely agricultural it develops its manufactures, and *vice versa*. In either case some element has to be obtained elsewhere. In a more

frankly brutal age this led to conquest and in no small degree accounted for the map of Europe and of the world of 1913. It has also led great nations far afield in the acquisition or control of alien territory and unassimilable populations. The continuance and success of the process in one nation necessarily has a grave reaction on the domestic and foreign policies of others. At this moment there are nations whose strong desire is to become independent of American cotton, wheat, and manufactures. Could it be quickly done it would put a dangerous strain of readjustment on all our economic development.

In short, the ideal of national economic independence is inspired solely by the necessities of war. If every state knew that its traders could buy its wheat, cotton, oil, coal, manufactures, to the extent of its purse, in open, free markets of the world, without fear of any act of international piracy going or coming, the ideal would follow a natural development for the good of the world. But this, of course, is another ideal, an ideal of peace, and its attainment depends upon an adjustment of world relations, in this particular respect, on common-sense business principles.

There is another domestic policy of states which may have a growing reaction on international relations. There is no right more jealously maintained, and properly so, than the right of a state to protect its political and social institutions against what may be called the forcible infiltration of alien ideas. Nothing is resented more, for example, than the attempt to sap the foundations of these institutions by propaganda. It makes little difference whether the institutions are good or bad, the national feeling

is the same. And the feeling is the stronger the more this propaganda is believed to be supported by the element of force, either latent and concealed or openly threatened. But there is another way by which old institutions may be threatened than by foreign propaganda. It is a way which in democracies is becoming increasingly difficult to meet. A state has a large area, very rich in its possibilities, but with a small, slowly growing population to develop its wealth. We will assume that it has been founded by a people of one general race, speaking a common language, following in general the same practices in religion, and, what is more, having an inherited, ingrained tendency of growth in its political and social ideas developed by an evolutionary process of the many ages of the race's existence. There comes a time when, perhaps with the sole original idea of increasing its material prosperity by increasing its production, it begins to cherish the ideal of becoming self-sustaining for purposes of war; and then it makes itself an asylum of refuge for all the world, as Livy tells us the founder of Rome did in order to increase the state's strength by increased numbers. The people who thus come have behind them, perhaps, centuries of a quite different inherited tendency to growth of political and social ideas. Then it is discovered that these tendencies are neither changed nor checked, at least by an oath of allegiance and the signing of a naturalization paper. And there may be no sufficient time to wait for a change in these tendencies. In a democracy newcomers can not be held for generations nor for a lifetime as aliens on sufferance. If there are great numbers of them no surer way could be found

for the deterioration of the native democracy. So, when it comes to that, the state changes its policy; it begins to withhold the privilege—which, meantime, the rest of the world may have come to regard as a right—of immigration, perhaps stopping it altogether. Other states which have no such problem, from which people desire to emigrate, to which none desire to immigrate, are bound to feel a serious reaction from this changed policy. For their peoples are democracies, too. From the thwarted hopes and desires of many of them there goes up a great clamor which their governments must take note of and which affects their relations with the other state. The state which I have used as an illustration is, of course, our own. Our people know that the intensity of the hopes and desires they are now thwarting grows out of the burdens of past wars which will weigh heavily on the shoulders of more than one generation, increased (and this counts, perhaps, more than all else) by forestalling the burdens of prospective war, to which they see no end. If, therefore, anyone asks me, "What interest has the United States in the affairs of Europe?" I first of all point to this question of immigration. Other lands are as fair to live in and to look upon as this; they have all the potentialities of individual happiness and prosperity. The god, whoever he may be, of the people who now yearn to leave them is nearer to them there than he ever will be here. And their desire to leave is in violence to their traditions, associations, and every inherited sentiment of their nature. It is on this selfish basis in this matter and many others that I put the interest of the United States in actively exerting all its influence in the betterment of world relations, so that no

man will desire to forswear his natural allegiance merely under the compulsion of intolerable man-made conditions.

There is, of course, another motive which operates in this migratory movement, which eventually becomes an irresistible compulsion—the pressure of population. Sooner or later this must become the subject not of a national, but of a world policy. It will be the sooner in proportion as devastating wars cease to have even the temporary effect of consuming surplus populations. In these days of rapid and easy transportation, the old theory that the ratio of reproduction diminishes in proportion as the population trenches on the food supply, fails as long as there is possibility of an abundant food supply anywhere in the world. A surplus which finds subsistence difficult—still more when it is almost impossible—overflows along the line of least resistance to where subsistence is easy. At first, governments concerned have every motive to keep their peoples at home. One of these motives, not necessarily the most powerful one, is that their man-power for war may not be reduced. If it is an agricultural country it encourages the increase of manufactures. It finds another advantage in this by its tendency to make the state self-sustaining for war. In time it finds that its manufacturing population can not be fed by the agricultural; also that with modern power-machinery it manufactures more than it can consume and it trades the surplus abroad for additional food.

As long as it has to be ready for war it would be dangerous to convert all of its agricultural population into a manufacturing one—even though this might conceivably be its natural condition for maxi-

mum prosperity—and purchase all its food abroad. Moreover, there is the same tendency on the part of all the large and rich—or would-be rich—states. The tendency will be for the market for surplus manufactures to go more and more to the poorer and less advanced nations, with less demand for them until their wants are increased by knowledge with slowly growing means to supply them. With increased knowledge of hygiene, sanitation, and the gradual elimination of destructive epidemic disease, the most powerful checks on growth of population are being slowly removed. It would seem that there must be a natural limit to the ability of a state to provide for its population. And in some this limit seems very near. When that time comes it will be as natural for a people to swarm as for a hive of bees. Where can the swarms go? A large part of the desirable surface of the earth, to which migratory people instinctively turn, are in the possession of two races,—the English- and the Spanish-speaking ones. They are relatively sparsely occupied and are rich in every possibility of undeveloped wealth. If any part invites the newcomers in large numbers it will in time find or believe that it is a question of the native or an alien social organism, perhaps civilization. Then the bars will be put up again. Moreover, there are parts of this area which look with as much apprehension on this sort of colonization on a large scale in other parts as if it were attempted in their own. This whole problem is for the moment perhaps more academic than otherwise. It is now being treated as a matter of national policy. The time may come when it must be a world policy. Either surplus populations must cease to be created, or they must be reduced as be-

fore by war and still more by pestilence, or the resulting swarms must be killed off by violence, or some place must be found where they can exist and play some useful part in the world.

These are some of the many policies that could be enumerated that affect, much or little, the relations of states. In respect to all of them it is scarcely too much to say that if the states were business corporations their boards of directors would adjust the differences growing out of them to the best ultimate interest of all.

But there is one national policy which, more than anything else, prevents these differences being considered and adjusted on business principles. I mean the policy of excessive armaments and the enormous preparations that must be constantly in operation in peace to use the armaments in war. It is not necessary to go into the details of this exceedingly complicated matter. You all know that they exist, that they are excessive, and that they are an excessive drain on the resources of the richest state. Whatever can be its cause, or even its necessity so long as the cause exists, most men will say that it is an abnormality in the body of what otherwise would be a normal state organism. Perhaps, in the states, in working back from effect to cause we might find that one first developed this abnormality and then infected all the rest; but after finding the cause, whatever it be, the fact remains that they are all infected and all know it.

Until comparatively recent times students of war have often noted the rapidity with which the combined efforts of nature and man repaired the ravages of war. The reason is not far to seek. A merely tired

man reacts more quickly from his fatigue than a totally exhausted man. Until comparatively recently the devastation was wrought by a relatively small number of the people of a state. The burden of maintaining them for that purpose largely ceased with the war and they returned to the ranks of productive labor. The population continued its toil to supply the wants of peace, and only a relatively small amount of extra labor, for no long time, sufficed to replace the losses of war. To-day also, with far greater armies in the field, a large part of them is returned, but far more slowly, to productive work. At the same time, under existing conditions, forces have to be kept under arms which were all that the state could maintain in peace before the war, when the state was richer. A large part of the energy of the state, instead of repairing losses, must continue to be used in maintaining its military establishment. Incidentally, it is interesting to speculate as to the present condition of Europe had it been possible to return only a reasonable number of non-productive men to productive labor, beginning with the date when the treaty with Germany began to operate. In this number I include the great number who are employed in peace in what is really non-productive labor—that is, non-productive of either temporary or permanent wealth—in the support of all branches of military establishments. At the minimum capitalization of the average man's labor it would certainly amount to not less than six or seven billions of dollars, during the last three and one-half years. At that rate all of Europe would be restored from the material losses of war long before the necessary sum can be extracted by force from any source. And it

would be done by humanizing, civilizing labor, the very doing of which would tend to restore moral as well as material losses.

If any doubt the possibility of what I have suggested, I would invite his attention to the demonstrated productivity of Germany beginning with the peace. Her army and navy were practically abolished. Her great manufacturing establishments could make nothing but railway engines, rails, bridge materials, agricultural machinery, and other things to meet the infinite requirements of peace. Think, then, what might have been the result to-day had all Europe worked for three and a half years under the same conditions.

One would think that if nations were governed by business men, even if they deliberately contemplated another war like the last one fifteen years from now, they would say, "Let's take the next ten years in complete rest, and then, having restored ourselves, we will take the next five years to prepare for the next war." Unfortunately, if the world must be governed as heretofore, that would not be good business; because, if they all start even, and even if they have to fight with bare fists, the nation of sixty or seventy millions has the advantage of one of forty millions. Civilization, therefore, has reached this terrible *impasse,* that when the smaller one has the good luck to get the larger one down, it must destroy it as an organized nation or keep it down by military force for all time. I can see no other conclusion. In all the studies you may make of problems growing out of European inter-state relations, I do not see how these facts can fail to stare you in the face; if the existing situation continues it means the gradual

doing to the death, as a nation, of one great state by another for its own salvation; if one relaxes its hold upon the throat of the other, and conditions remain as before, it means as before the destruction of one or the other by the other, only to be prevented, if it is, by another world war with the same conditions prevailing after it. Those who cherish any other hope must believe that there is coming a slow betterment in state relations. Even they, many of them, believe that it will require another and another world war to teach humanity its lesson. The lesson is as plainly before us as if written in a schoolboy's textbook. It is that state relations will never be bettered in their ultimate results until nations have some other reasonable assurance of safety from each other than that on which primeval man did and the modern savage does rely.

Now let us consider very briefly whether there is any hope of a betterment of state relations that will reasonably minimize the chances of a world war.

I begin with the assumption that the progress, the rapid progress, of civilization does not depend upon the cessation of war in the abstract. Even the moralist cannot maintain that. Notwithstanding all the forms of wickedness he may find in war, he is confronted by the *fact* that civilization has progressed in spite of war. Of course, it would be difficult to establish the relation of cause and effect between war and civilization, though there are many students of the question who do think that they see that relation. For our immediate purpose it would be a matter of idle guesswork; because, on the one hand, we have an observed fact, on the other, nothing but speculation as to the form that fact might have taken

and the relative time in which it would have taken that form under other conditions.

To my mind, therefore, the practical question is solely this: Admitting all the good that anyone can claim for war in the past, is it true or not that civilization is approaching the point where all these things will be more endangered by the unchecked forces working within itself, and, therefore, that war within itself is becoming more dangerous than profitable to civilization?

Curiously enough, the very fact that it is a business question makes it a very slippery one to take hold of. It is good business from the point of view of all, moralists and others, to guarantee the safety of persons and property within a state, and all agree on the agencies by which this is done. It is equally good business for the state to do this by the only agencies it has and as long as they are the only ones as against exterior violence. Now let us make an extreme supposition to the effect that the peoples and the rulers of all the great states are anxious to make some change in the agencies now at their disposition to preserve the safety of their states. What is likely to be the attitude of those leaders to such a question? It will be that of a cautious driver of a high-spirited team of horses, who knows that any relaxing in the restraint of the reins may result in a runaway. I think that is, to some extent, the attitude, quite justifiable, of leaders of states towards this question of excessive military preparation made necessary by all the moment it is the policy of one. If the people of any one state take the bit in their teeth, as it were, and do away with this policy without a practicable agreement with the others really concerned, it will

invite the danger it fears. It would almost seem that if all the dethroned kings, kaisers, and tsars of recent years were restored they might, as a simple matter of gain or loss in the light of their recent experience, settle the question better than anyone else. King Demos may have to learn his lesson as they did theirs. Unfortunately, if he too is dethroned in the process, he is the last of the line.

The doing of something more promptly to improve the relations of states, we unintentionally make ourselves think more hopeless than it really is. We often talk of having to create a unified world sentiment before anything can be done. That is true, if one thinks of stopping all war everywhere. What we are now talking of is the checking of war within our civilization, not outside. It is threatened by nothing outside it except as its own struggles waste its strength to resist pressure from something outside it. If there were an otherwise united Europe today, would even the most timid have the least fear of Bolshevist Russia, either its propaganda or its arms? Would anything more quickly correct the extremes of Bolshevism than a united Europe? Every state that now has such fear knows that it results from its own dissensions with its neighbors and its internal condition resulting from these dissensions. Our problem is solely one of our civilization, and in reality of only a few states of it. Two or three others, in addition to the few that sat in the recent Arms Conference in Washington, are all that is necessary to get only half-way together to begin. We got five of them together; I think that yesterday the treaties they made became effective. Is it too much to say that it is the unshirkable duty of the state which did

that to make a determined effort to get seven or eight together? Suppose that for the next century all disputes between the important powers of Europe, including their dependencies elsewhere, and two or three powers outside of Europe could be settled without resort to war, it would seem quite clear that really great wars would disappear for that time. And as during such a condition the gain of the large powers would depend on peace elsewhere, they would have every interest in checking smaller wars, refusing to supply money, arms, and all materials for war.

But such a condition cannot be realized from a mere agreement. To keep nations in such an equilibrium there must be some stabilizing agency constantly at work. Three such have been proposed. The first is arbitration. It has been tried from the beginning of history. When resorted to it secures the aid of the real stabilizer—time. But nations look lukewarmly on it and resort to it mainly when neither side sees enough to gain to warrant more costly measures. The business sense of nations makes them fairly ready to arbitrate a claim of concrete money value, even disputed boundaries. Everyone in the community is able to set off the maximum that he stands to win or lose by arbitration against the unknown but enormous losses of even a successful war. If they fight over such a question, it is generally a pretext, and the real cause lies behind it. The United States has had some eighty-three or eighty-four such settlements. They range in amounts from several millions to a few thousands. Within the extremes of this list would probably come the money value of the original default in delivered material which led

to the occupation of the Ruhr. In other cases arbitration may not be a satisfactory settlement because two-thirds of the arbitrators represent the interested parties. The third is in reality the final judge. But neither plaintiff nor defendant has the protection of a judge sitting as an independent court, interpreting accepted law. Thus, arbitration has prevented war only in sporadic cases.

During all these twenty-five centuries of arbitration, beginning with the efforts that Thucydides tells us of, men's minds constantly turned to some form of limited association of states. We see a long series of them from the leagues of Ancient Greece, down to the Holy Alliance, the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliance, the Triple Alliance, and the Triple Entente. In the maintenance of general peace they all failed. The object of their existence was ultimate war. They all aimed at securing peace among their members while they developed and conserved their strength against a common enemy. They were necessarily associations of states as heavily armed as the science of the time permitted; otherwise a member was of no value for the common object. In an association of strongly armed nations some members may have objects for their common good in addition to defense against a common enemy. As fear of the latter diminishes as a compelling, unifying force, a stronger member or a group more closely united with each other than with the rest has invariably sought political ascendency to carry out purposes of its own. This is the first step to dissolution. There can be no free and equal association when anyone has it in his power to add the weight of arms to make up for deficient weight of reason in the scales of justice. When

two such associations are formed against each other and the inevitable war comes, the vanquished one is dissolved by defeat, the victorious one (the unifying fear having disappeared) begins to dissolve by dissension. Both of these processes we have recently seen or are now witnessing. And invariably the ultimate reason is the existence *somewhere* in the association of dominating military strength which removes the necessity of an appeal to reason over a considerable time before force can be resorted to. For that reason, I can not believe that a league of all Europe, had it existed in 1914, except under one condition, could have prevented the Great War. The nations that began it, and some others, were armed to the teeth. Germany and her allies could have said, as they practically did, "The League will not let us do what we want; we believe we can whip it, and we will." But does anyone suppose that, had such a League existed long enough (and it will require no short time) for the nations of Europe from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic to learn that they received at its hands substantial justice, long enough for the peoples to believe this—does anyone suppose that those peoples would have continued to bear their excessive burdens of preparation for war solely to attain that same result? There might then have been created a situation that would have been a compelling motive to reason. As it was, the only hope of the Central Powers was in the immediate resort to force.

Now, out of the Great War has come an association of nations such as was never attempted before. But it had been dreamed of before. I remember that in Paris, in 1919, the commission which studied the

subject—of which I did not have the honor to be a member—had before it some seven or eight formal projects for such an association. These had their agreements and their differences. Most of them, I think, antedated the war. All agreed in the object of limiting war. Some were inspired by a dread of the war that was coming. One was American in origin. All were devised by distinguished jurists and publicists. None of them aroused any marked disapproval. Nor, I think, did any of them attract wide public attention in any country. The governments were hostile. Some of them deliberately intended to make one more trial of the old method, ready to stake all in the hope that they could then impose their own peace for the next hundred years. The peoples, unthinking, unknowing, were apathetic, putting blind trust in their governments, whose business after all was to protect them.

The culmination of all these projects was the League as embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. It is very unfortunate that it had to go there, but there it had to go. In the early days of the peace conference there were already influences at work to side-step this issue, not for the purpose of taking it up as a measure independent of a treaty of peace, but to kill it altogether. Had it not gone into the treaty, the project would have been dead until revived by another world war. And those who devised it cherished the fond hope that it would materially lessen the chance of such a war.

I have said that any association, whether of individuals or of nations, must have a definitely stated object in order to accomplish anything, and must agree on definite rules of procedure in order to attain

it. To be most effective the object must be simple as well as definite and the rules must be subject to modification as experience shows it to be wise. But all who are in the association must agree upon the rules.

Now, what is the object of the treaty League? It is stated in the preamble, which has been accepted, together with the rules, by four out of the five great powers of the present moment and by practically all of the lesser powers. It is in four parts, all essential for the maintenance of world peace, and were they reasonably carried out, as solemn treaty obligations, would maintain it. They are:

(1) the acceptance (by the signatory powers) of obligations not to resort to war (the remaining three were intended to warrant the nations in accepting this obligation);

(2) the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations;

(3) the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments; and

(4) the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another.

Is there any American who knowingly rejects that object? Can there be any doubt that the mass of the people—could they consider the question independently of domestic politics, and if whenever it is presented to them by our political leaders there were, first of all, a clear, unbiassed statement of that object and what its attainment means—would not only overwhelmingly accept the object, but would, in view of its supreme importance, attach a different value to

the rules proposed for its attainment, or at least endeavor to make rules which they can accept?

But we have rejected the entire document. Does that relieve us from any interest and absolve us from all responsibility in the future peace of the world? Does it not deepen the one and make the other heavier?

It will be said that we accomplish all we can, by ourselves maintaining and helping other nations to maintain international justice. Well, that is the fourth phase of the general object proposed by the League. Out of it and in order to make it effective has come the International Court of Justice. In presenting the question of our adherence to this Court, our late lamented President Harding, whose name is immortalized by the fact that he was the first ruler in history who showed the great nations, armed, jealous, hostile, the first step in reasonable disarmament by mutual agreement, said:

> Our nation has a conspicuous place in the advocacy of such an agency of peace and international adjustment, and our deliberate public opinion of to-day is overwhelmingly in favor of our full participation. . . . It is for this reason that I am now asking for the consent of the Senate to our adhesion to the protocol. . . . It is not a new problem in international relationship, it is wholly a question of accepting an established institution of high character, and making effective all the fine things which have been said by us in favor of such an agency of advanced civilization.

This agency, too, the second of the only two that men have been able to propose as aids to the peace of the world, we have—not rejected, to be sure—but received in such a way as makes its acceptance problematic. I think it is becoming more and more

problematic, and I will tell you why I think so. Not long ago I was talking with a man in quite humble position, hard-working, hard-headed, and clear-thinking. I had told him that I thought these two agencies of peace seemed to me to be worth trying out, and asked him what he thought and the men of his class. "No," he said, "I don't want them, nor does anyone else of my class with whom I talk. We have already fought for that peace you talk of, and I was told that it would last." He jotted down some figures on a piece of paper and read them to me. "I have read," said he, "that we are in debt twenty-five billions of dollars for our share of that peace; that we loaned other nations ten billions to help them get their share; and that, besides that, we taxed ourselves in cash eighteen billions more to clinch the matter. And what have I got out of it? Taxes—and two dead sons —and appeals for more help. What good are all your agencies of peace against their agencies of war?" It is very difficult for a few wise men about a table, guided by the experience of all history, to make head against millions who think that.

But, for all that, this man had put his finger on the basic difficulty—excessive armaments. All men deeply interested in the International Court of Justice and the League express the opinion that their success depends upon a gradually growing world sentiment that will support with increasing strength the judgments of the Court and the decisions of the League; that the result of that will be a gradual reduction of excessive armaments. It is very likely that the first time two great nations, with their armed retainers at their backs, appear before the International Court, submitting to its judgment some great

question of peace or war, and loyally abiding by the judgment, excessive armament will melt away like snow under the spring sun. In such a case, I think the world's sense of humor would laugh them out of existence. But it is the present existence of these armaments that does and will prevent the great states from submitting to the Court important questions that really involve the issue of war. And, could we assume that they would do this, think what a dangerous thing this powerful weapon may be in the hands of an excited, passionate democracy, tempting it to thwart by force a disappointing judgment of the Court. If such a thing happened, it would be more disastrous to its world prestige than if such nations did not appear before it. No democracy can endure long which does not put strong checks upon its own passions. And in this case the only check possible is to lay a dangerous weapon quite out of reach. It is restraint upon themselves and not others that they need. At this moment, there is a grave question pending in Europe, involving the interpretation of treaty. Does anyone suppose that the party most heavily armed will submit it to the judgment of the International Court? Moreover, Europe is at this moment largely back in the status of armed alliances by treaties based on the assumption of armament. One of the objects of the League is to maintain a scrupulous regard for all treaty obligations which involve the maintenance of these armaments. These alliances and independent states are, it is stated, in part armed and financed for war by larger ones. This will have its effect upon their readiness to resort to the International Court of Justice. How small a chance is there that one of those states would sub-

mit a serious dispute with Germany to the judgment of the Court unless the power on which it depends is willing to do so.

But, if our policy is one of no support to the League whose rules we neither accept nor ask to have so modified that we can accept them, and possibly the same towards the International Court of Justice, have we no policy with respect to the object which they were devised to attain? I quote again from the words of our late President which he addressed to the foreign delegates at the opening of the Limitation of Armaments Conference at Washington:

"We wish to sit with you," he said, "at the table of international understanding and good-will. In good conscience we are eager to meet you frankly, and invite and offer coöperation. . . . I can speak officially only for our United States. Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war."

Will any man—any American or foreigner that may be within our borders—stand before the tomb of our dead President and say that that is not a good policy?—that we and they want the nations to sit at the table of understanding and good-will (and I do not read into those words any meaning that they may not have had), that we and they will invite and offer coöperation, and that we and they want less of armament throughout the world. It is a good policy for us and them, and we can do nothing better than carry it into effect as far as possible.

You will have noted that thinking men believe that the success of any agencies in the betterment of world relations depends upon a growing favorable sentiment to support them. I have stated my opinion

that to begin with, and mainly, such sentiment must be created in relatively few states. I also believe that it must be organized, not created,—for it already exists in an aimless, expressionless form,—in the masses of the people. The peoples feel, have a belief on this subject; but they have little or no knowledge of vital facts. In their ignorance of these they cannot formulate their belief into a wise, conservative policy. They are helpless in the hands of many men of short-sighted policy who play upon the panic fears that are so easily aroused in the mass.

I have often wondered whether this Institute of Politics, international politics, has not an important rôle in this matter. I know that the problems you are studying are of intense interest to the diplomat, to the international jurist, to the political and social economist, to the broad-minded financier who studies the production of wealth in the interest of his fellow men. But you cannot pursue those studies very far without raising, in some degree, the ominous question of the peace of the state within and its security from without. For that reason among others you associate with you professional military men. Their gravest study begins with and grows out of the failure of your solutions of other problems: when the problem becomes—no very difficult one as an abstract proposition—how to destroy wealth rather than create it, and when after a vain effort to preserve it, the diplomat abdicates his functions, when the jurisconsult finds international law and justice swallowed up in universal violence, when the economist admits that his projects for the betterment of all conditions of life for the state, the family, and the individual are, for the time at least, idle dreams. You must have

the most vital interest in helping on the one solution that will make your others lasting; in seeing that the structure you rear is not ruined by the first nation—insane with passion and fear, whose passions and fears may be played on by men themselves insane with ambition or greed—that chooses to run amuck.

Perhaps such a study might be found in one of the important functions of the existing League. Its Article 8, after recognition by all the members that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments, directs its Council to formulate plans for such reduction. It made an honest but, I think, mistaken effort and failed. In carrying out another object, the maintenance of justice, they associated with themselves the ablest jurists in the world. The result is the International Court of Justice. In the other case, the decision should have been made, largely, on the advice of the ablest business men of the world, its financiers and economists. But it was decided largely on the mere failure of certain military men to agree.

We will accept that fact and look at another matter. The essential object of the League, declared in its preamble, is "the acceptance [by its members] of obligations not to resort to war." The Council apparently assumed that reduction of armaments was a prior necessity. It is of the gravest importance; nevertheless, nations have accepted such obligations not to resort to war, except under specific conditions, without disarmament. The United States is now under that obligation with thirty states, of whom three are among the present five great powers of the world. The preamble to the League lays down

three things that ought to warrant the signatory nations not to resort to war except under specified conditions. They are all summed up in the establishment of an International Court of Justice. It has been established and accepted by practically all of them. Why should not the Council now make a persistent, continuing effort to get a few great powers to agree on what things, however few they may be, they will submit to that Court? I think the smaller states will all follow them. I do not think that the United States, though not a member of the League, would refuse to follow them. And if it should finally give its adhesion to the protocol creating the International Court, none would have a greater interest in enhancing its prestige. And if it really be its policy—to use the words I quoted before—"to sit at the table of international understanding and good-will, to invite and offer coöperation," none could better take the lead in bringing this about. A well-considered study of this subject by this Institute, spread broadcast, amplifying all these details and more, would vastly help in creating that organized public sentiment in this country and in Europe that is necessary in order to lead to that action. If we will do nothing to help lead the League from within, we might at least give it a push from the outside.

There is another source of help. This Institute embodies the personnel of many great institutions of learning. The ancient philosophers were, one might almost say, the faculties of universities of Athens and Rome. There they preached the doctrine of the duty of the citizen to his state until it saturated everyone from youth to age, and became a doctrine of their philosophy.

I think that the faculties of our colleges and universities have an opportunity of elaborating and teaching a modern system of political philosophy in which a cardinal doctrine shall be the duty of the citizen to do all he can to assist his state in determining its true and wise relations, its common-sense business relations, to all other states, and then to help his state to do all it can to bring those relations into living force. In doing this they should be free, and untrammelled by any suggestion from the state. There will be many minor differences, but it is out of this collision of mind with mind that the spark of truth is elicited. Why should this not be begun under the auspices of an Institute like this? It would soon play a great part in the creation of a sane, conservative, and practical sentiment in the nation and would be bound to influence that in other nations.

There is another possible aid to world sentiment that I think is perfectly practicable. Everyone knows the complex relations of interdependence of modern states. They are connected by a vast network of interlacing lines. The ships of all are in the ports of each. Every kind of works of improvement are financed with money from the other side of the earth. The cutting of one of these lines in the network means tapping the lifeblood of many. All the world is a vast business association. An injury or a benefit to one is an injury or benefit to all. After the present unreasoning passions and hate have died out in Europe—during the existence of which any cause or pretext may bring war—we shall find in the future, as for a long time in the past, that international wars, after the husk of pretext has been stripped off, are commercial wars. They are like the business

wars that we have seen within our lifetime in our own state. As each new business entity has been created and begins to grow in importance, others have sought to secure their own safety and prosperity by a sort of isolation, by weakening or absorbing or destroying their rival. That has been the history of our railroads and other forms of big business. But they have gradually learned that commercial war does not pay; that the state is big enough for the maximum prosperity of each, and that the natural growth of each is for the benefit of all.

As the world has become such an association, business men should have far more to say in its management than they have. Take the question of the Ruhr, for example. Assume that that situation grew out of the failure to deliver certain amounts of material, mainly coal and coke. That material was produced by business men in one country and was wanted by business men in another. It is true that it was being delivered under a treaty as a penalty. But the people who produced the coal or coke were paid by their government, just as under normal conditions they would have been paid by the foreign receiver of it. I have no doubt that if the two governments had stood aside and said to their business men concerned, "Settle this matter as it best can be settled," they could have done so, had it been done in time.

In fact, it is perhaps not too much to say that all of the serious complication of this moment in Europe, in so far as it has really grown out of the question of reparations, is entirely due to the fact that a purely business question has been handled by political and military men instead of by the real business men of the countries concerned. When the

Treaty was being formulated and after the general principles of reparations had been agreed upon and accepted by the governments of the five great powers, they took up the question of the method of applying the corresponding provisions of the Treaty. There was universal agreement as to the grave danger of leaving this in the unchecked hands of the governments themselves. They plainly foresaw the complications that would otherwise arise and which actually have arisen. They knew that innumerable questions would arise which, if left to popular governments, would be settled by the passionate clamor of peoples who could know nothing of the merits of the case. Therefore, by unanimous consent, the governments provided in Article 233 that:

> The amount of the above damage for which compensation is to be made by Germany shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be called the Reparation Commission.
>
> This Commission shall consider the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard.
>
> The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to the German Government on or before May 1, 1921, as representing the extent of that Government's obligations.
>
> The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921.

Article 234 provided that:

> The Reparation Commission shall after May 1, 1921, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany, and after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the

date, and to modify the form of payments . . . but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

Article 240 provides that:

The German Government recognizes the Commission provided for . . . and agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such Commission, of the power and authority given to it under the present Treaty.

Finally, Annex II, Par. 12, provided that:

The Commission shall have all the powers conferred upon it, and shall exercise all the functions assigned to it, by the present Treaty.

You will note that the Treaty provides for only one case in which the governments have any power of control over the action of the Commission: i.e., the latter cannot remit any portion of the sum which the Commission may have fixed without the concurrence of the several governments represented on the Commission. It was plainly intended that all these questions should be definitely settled by the untrammelled judgment of a Commission of business men, economic and financial experts. Yet, if you will consult a file of despatches relating to its business, from the first day the Commission began its work, you will find constant interference by the governments by instructions to their representatives to demand this or that or not to consent to this or that.

You will note how completely in ignorance our people and those of other nations have been left as to the real business merits of the point in controversy. Suppose that during this time and for the future there were a permanent Commission of In-

formation and Advice, representing the best business sentiment of some half dozen nations. Its members should have no political aspirations. Appointed by the governments they should not be selected by them but by the business and financial associations of the various countries. It should make its headquarters, from time to time, where it pleases, in this country as well as others. Its sole duty is to study all business questions that affect the relations of states, to study the ways in which untrammelled business men would settle such questions as the fair distribution of raw materials, the indiscriminate manufacture by anyone who desires to do so of military arms and their sale to whosoever has the money to pay, and many other questions that will suggest themselves. Their reports, brief, frequent, expressed in language that all can understand, and whether they are unanimous or not, are to be published in full and at once in each country. No government need accept this Commission's advice. It need not give it, but only information to the people. I believe that such a course would soon have a unifying tendency on the world's public opinion on questions out of which war may come.

Finally, if there be any country the policy of which is summed up in the desire for less armament throughout the world and in a willingness to invite and offer coöperation to that end, why would it not be well for it to do as one of the governments had done when the Limitation of Armaments Conference met in Washington—have a most conservative plan of its own worked out and all ready for discussion? It need not announce it, but its representatives abroad could know it and could discuss it as an unofficial fact

in smoking rooms after dinner, on railway journeys, in their offices, until the mass of the people would know that somewhere there was an important nation ready to discuss the matter whenever they were. I believe that intelligent and burdened peoples would before very long see to it that their governments were ready.

As you will see, my belief is that the question of armament, like other grave ones pending between the nations, is a business one; that they will not be settled by the moralist or altruist but by the creation by business men, independently of the governments, of a sentiment in the mass of the people that political governments must take note of.

WORLD PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY

BY PHILIP HENRY KERR

I

WORLD PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY

A. THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE

The purpose of this conference is to try to obtain a bird's-eye view of the fundamental world problems of to-day. We are sometimes so immersed in the consideration of the particular disputes in the foreground, such as that in the Ruhr, that we lose sight of the larger issues of which the question of the moment is but an aspect. Order will never be reached in the international sphere unless we think out the problems which confront us far more deeply than is usual to-day.

People sometimes talk as if the establishment of permanent peace and economic prosperity in the world were just a matter of making a few just treaties, after which all would be well. A few moments' reflection will show us that the problem is something fundamentally different. Let us consider what the world in which we live is like from the political standpoint and what is the historic process by which we have reached our present state.

Though there are no really accurate statistics a rough comparison of the best estimates shows that there about 1,650,000,000 people alive upon the surface of the globe at the present time. These people, of course, represent an almost infinite diversity of type. But there are certain broad classifications which lie at the root of the larger international problems of our time, and which it is important to note.

One of the most deep-rooted is that of color. The white population of the world numbers about 560,000,000, the brown and yellow about 850,000,000, and the black about 100,000,000. Language is another important classification. There are about 130 different languages in the world, apart from mere local dialects. More people talk Chinese than any other language, though I believe there are really several languages in China, all having the same ultimate structure. English comes next with 160,000,000 people speaking it as their first language. We may note in passing that English is clearly destined to become the world language, for outside the basin of the Mediterranean it is already the international language of the earth. Then come Russian with about 130,000,000, German with 100,000,000, and so on.

Religion is perhaps the most important classification of all, for a people's religious beliefs lie at the root of their civilization. The number of the adherents of the chief religions is roughly as follows: Christian, 560,000,000, Confucian and Taoist 300,000,000, Mohammedan 220,000,000, Hindu 210,000,000, Buddhist 130,000,000. In addition, the divisions of the Christian world are said to be: Roman Catholic 270,000,000, Protestant 170,000,000, Greek Orthodox 120,000,000.

It is also worth taking a look at geographical distribution and governmental organization. The continent of Asia contains more than half the human race, over 850,000,000 people, Europe comes next with 450,000,000, North America contains about 140,000,000, Africa about 130,000,000, South America about 65,000,000, and Australasia about 7,000,000. Humanity, so distributed, is divided among some

sixty separate states and empires, 27 in Europe, 18 in Asia, 9 in South America, and 8 in North America.

These statistics, though they touch only the fringe of the subject, make clear the extraordinary complexity of the international problem with which the modern world has to deal. All history has been concerned with the interaction of these forces and groups.

The figures of races, languages, colors, and so forth, however, deal only with the surface aspect, so to speak, of the human map. There are other factors no less important, which make the relief map of humanity. Take civilization. At the very dawn of history we see the attempt of the Egyptians to build up a new civilization in the valley of the Nile and to protect it from encroachment from without. Later come the efforts of both the Greeks and the Romans to develop still more advanced societies. Both of these civilizations were involved in long and tremendous struggles for existence, the one with the Medes and Persians, the other with the Carthaginians, and both gave way at length to less civilized pressure from outside. Then Europe went into the Dark Ages until modern civilization appeared.

Then again there is the constant attempt of humanity to reach out for an ampler economic standard, or for more space and freedom. This has been the cause of those continuous migrations of Goths and Huns and Vandals and countless other peoples, which swept across Europe, overwhelmed Rome, and moved across the oceans, and whose latest aspect is to be seen in the waves of humanity which now break endlessly upon the bleak shores of Ellis Island.

The necessity for government has been another factor. Throughout all time mankind has been constantly at work trying to obtain stable conditions of peace and prosperity by uniting under strong governments. In early days and among more backward peoples government was in the unstable hands of personal rulers. Nowadays government itself has become more stable as the people have learned how to frame just laws and to obey them for themselves. But the area controlled by these governments is still in a constant condition of flux, and the relations between their inhabitants are hostile and conflicting, for the primary need of every state has been to secure the geographical situation, the armaments, the organization, the raw materials, the food supplies, and so forth, necessary for the maintenance of its own independence. The modern anxiety about oil and rubber and markets is simply an expression of the same need as that which prompted more primitive communities to seize their neighbors' lands.

There is also the factor of discovery and invention, most prominent in our modern times. The discovery of the compass, of America, and new roads to the East; of the use of steam and electricity for power; of printing; of the telegraph and telephone; of labor-saving and mechanical-production devices of every kind, has produced an extraordinary complication in human affairs. It has aggravated competition between civilized states. It has established for the time being the absolute ascendency of the West over Asia and Africa. It has produced an entirely new crop of international problems of an economic character, problems which are still multiplying every day.

Finally, there is what I consider the most important of all, moral progress—that is to say, the degree to which the idea of right and wrong has superseded the calculation of self-interest in individual and public affairs. I believe that the two greatest factors in human progress have been the formulation of the Ten Commandments and the utterance of the Sermon on the Mount. For the advance of humanity has sprung not so much from mechanical invention, whereby man has learned how to make use of the forces of nature, as from the measure of control he has learned to establish over himself through his fidelity to moral and spiritual truth. The real triumphs of man have not been the steam engine or the telephone, beneficent as these are, but in such achievements as these: the substitution of the idea of the reign of law for that of personal rule, broadly known as democracy; the vindication of individual rights, confirmed in Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the United States; the humanitarian movement, finding expression in modern hospital service, the Red Cross, and social and relief work of every kind, especially for children; the idea of tolerance, especially in the sphere of religious opinion; and, last of all in time, the recognition of women's rights. The structure of civilization really rests on these bases, and the driving force which has produced them all has been the moral conviction that there is a difference between right and wrong. It is true that honesty is the best policy as a business proposition, but what has really made men honest has been the recognition that honesty is right and dishonesty shameful.

All elements in the relief map of humanity—civilization, government, discovery and invention, and the rest—have produced conflict and collision in every corner of the globe, no less than the classifications of race, color, language, and geography. It is curious, too, that moral advance has been associated with fiercer battles and wars than almost any other aspect of human life. That may be partly because moral conviction is often one-sided and intolerant. It is even more because the world usually bitterly resists moral progress. But if you scan history you will see an immense number of vehement struggles over moral reform. The attempts of the Israelites to establish the first polity ever founded on moral ideas led them to a series of savage struggles with all their neighbors. Greece was able to lay firmly the foundations of democratic government only after the battles of Thermopylæ, Salamis, and Marathon. Rome had to fight Cannæ before the idea of the universality of law could prevail. Christendom had to save itself from destruction at the hands of Mohammedanism at Tours in 732 and Vienna in 1529. The Reformation produced the Thirty Years' War of religion, which is said to have reduced the population of Germany from thirty millions to eight. Political freedom was established in England only at the price of three tremendous struggles with autocracy represented by Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, and Napoleon. Democracy obtained its final start with the war of the American revolution, but had to fight the Great War of 1914 before it could triumph in Europe. And a civil war had to be fought in the heart of America before slavery could be abolished

and unity made secure. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that war is necessary to progress. Far from it. I am only concerned to show that in fact, up to the present day, it has invariably been the accompaniment of it.

The truth is that the world presents a picture of almost inextricable confusion. The division of humanity into innumerable tribes and peoples, of every kind of race, religion, and culture, shifting in location and size, implies constant competition and collision and has done so ever since history began. That is why I said at the beginning that the notion that we could attain to world peace or the conditions of permanent economic prosperity by making a few just treaties or even by turning on a little more international good-will, is not true. We are living in the middle of a vast historic process of growth out of ignorance and barbarism, in which collision and confusion have gradually and by almost imperceptible degrees been ended in many spheres of human activity by establishing the supremacy of the moral law. To-day, however, international chaos is more intense that it has ever been, precisely because, while modern invention has multiplied human contacts in a million ways and almost destroyed the old isolation of time and space, practically no progress has been made in bringing international relations under the control of the moral law. Before this conference is over I propose to try to show the kind of moral advance which is needed if we are to establish in this world as a whole the kind of peace and order and opportunity which we regard as normal and necessary within each of our separate states.

B. HOW THE WORLD IS GOVERNED

How are the complicated relations between the elements of the changing and fluid mass of humanity adjusted to-day? For they are adjusted somehow. The mechanism of government in the modern world consists of about sixty sovereign states. Every human being is a member of a state. Some of these states are large, like the British Commonwealth or Russia or the United States, each containing a considerable proportion of the human race and including many different races and even colors and civilizations within itself. Some of them are very small, like the Central American republics or Albania or the new Baltic states. Some states, again, are advanced democracies in which the government is effectively under the control of the people. Others, again, are primitive groups in which the organization of society is tribal as in Abyssinia, or autocratic in the sense that it is in the hands of a despot or of an oligarchy, as in Russia, old and new. But one and all they have the same fundamental characteristic. Every state consists of a community of individuals united in a legally unlimited allegiance to one another, and acknowledging the supremacy of a single ruler or organic law. An individual may transfer his allegiance from one community to another, but he practically cannot escape being a member of some state or other.

The fundamental purpose of the state is to maintain the reign of law, and the essence of the reign of law is the substitution of political and judicial methods for the use of force in the affairs of the community. The state, indeed, is the primary and essential basis of human society. Society never has

existed and can not exist without the state. The only difference between states lies in the degree in which the mass of the people control their governments and the liberal and beneficent or repressive and reactionary character of their laws and constitutions. But the state itself is the condition of peace and order on every atom of the earth's surface to-day.

Now, if you come to think of it, very much the same elements of controversy exist inside most states as exist in the world as a whole. There are difficulties about race and religion, language and culture, color and economics. There are the same kinds of human greed and ambition and pride, the same idealism and desire for moral reform. How does the state solve these controversies without war? It does so because citizenship in a state implies an obligation on the part of all citizens to submit their differences to the arbitrament of law and to refrain from the use of force for their own ends. Hence disputes between individuals are adjusted in the law courts in accordance mainly with common law. Disputes about public policy or between sections of the community are settled after debate in the legislature by a majority decision embodied in a law. And the community maintains a police force and an army whose business it is to enforce the reign of law by compelling individuals or minorities who wish to disobey the law to obey it and to confine their attempts to gain their ends to constitutional methods. The primary characteristic of the state, therefore, is the executive, legislative, and judicial machinery, established under a constitution, through which the community abolishes the private use of force and substitutes for it the reign of law. And this machinery provides a

means whereby every conceivable kind of question which can arise within its boundaries can be settled by peaceful and legal means and not by fighting or war.

As between states, however, there is a fundamental difference. There is no world state. Every state is a law unto itself. There is therefore no reign of law, and therefore no method of adjusting international disputes by legislative or judicial means; and even where an arbitral method can be contrived there is no police means for compelling the parties to a dispute to appeal to it or to accept and execute its decisions. In consequence, wherever states can not voluntarily agree there is no method of settling disputes between them save an appeal to force, in some shape or form.

In practice the affairs of humanity, so far as they are interstate, are adjusted in three ways. There is, first of all, diplomacy or negotiation, sometimes in public as at the arms conference at Washington, sometimes in private between the foreign offices of the countries concerned. Secondly, there is international law, whereby a number of relatively uncontroversial matters such as the interpretation of treaties can be settled by quasi-judicial means. Finally, there is force. Now, force does not always, or indeed usually, mean war. The fear of the consequences of a dispute is a constant incentive to statesmen to agree. The knowledge that a state is in a position to bring force to bear often makes a nation reasonable where it wants to be unreasonable. It was unquestionably Mr. Lloyd George's demonstration at Chanak last year that induced the Turks to desist peacefully from their project of crossing into Eu-

rope. The United States has frequently been compelled to make some forcible indication of its determination before agreements with some of the Central American republics have been made. The action of the German Government in sending a battleship to Agadir in 1911 was an instance of the diplomacy of the mailed fist. Whether we like it or not, whether it is used for honorable or dishonorable ends, the fact is that the background of international relations today is force, because in the absence of the reign of law there is in the last resort no other way in which a nation can defend itself, can maintain its rights when another state is unjust or unreasonable, and protect its citizens when they are wronged, than the use of force or the threat to use it.

Now consider the consequences of this. Why is it that whereas, inside the state, we have made immense progress within the last century, in the international sphere we still indulge in competitive armaments, and secret diplomacy; and that the world is filled with wars and rumors of wars? It is because force is a nation's only final means of redress. Therefore every nation is concerned to see that in the event of a quarrel it is in a position to defend itself or to protect its rights. It wants an adequate army and navy. It wants proper strategic points for defense. It wants supplies of food and raw materials necessary to its existence under its own control. And inasmuch as it is impossible for every nation to have all the strategic points and predominant armaments and to be absolutely self-contained, there is constant anxiety between nations about their security and about the preparations of their neighbors. It is just like what happened in the early days in the wild and woolly

west before the reign of law was set up. Whenever a man's hand went near his hip pocket everybody else drew his gun so as to be in a position to shoot first. Every nation has to have its hand upon its hip pocket to-day. That is why it has always proved impracticable to make arrangements for any permanent limitation of armaments or for any stable international peace. It is not because of any special malignity on the part of the nations; it is because, as nations, we are still living in the jungle—because we have not brought ourselves under the reign of law, and therefore have to adopt the methods of self-defense which are appropriate to the jungle.

It is just the same with that much-abused phenomenon, Imperialism. The term Imperialism is used in America very much as the word Capitalism is used in labor circles, as a synonym for the seven deadly sins. In point of fact, like capitalism, imperialism is a word which describes an essential process, though because of the evils connected with it the good aspects have been forgotten in the bad. Imperialism in its bad sense is the domination or exploitation of a weaker people by a stronger, for its own benefit. Imperialism in the good sense is the effort of a relatively civilized nation to do the work of helping to maintain international peace and order or to promote good government or protect the weak, in a world in which the reign of law has not yet been established. There is no way of ending imperialism save by the establishment of the reign of world law.

Finally, let us consider the problems which confront the world to-day in the light of the means we have for dealing with them. There is the vast series of questions involved in the changing relations be-

tween East and West, aggravated everywhere by the color line. There are the new problems involved in the supply of raw materials from all over the world and the finding of world markets for the modern industrial nations, without war between themselves or the ruin of the backward peoples. There is the problem of the better distribution of the population of the earth, white, brown, yellow, and black. There is the problem of controlling armaments. There is the problem of preventing war. If these questions could be dealt with by the means to which we are accustomed within the civilized state, they would not be so very difficult. But we have no such means. There is no world state. They have to be solved by sixty sovereign states, each independent, each with separate interests, each armed, each ignorant and jealous of its neighbors, and with no method of adjusting things when they cannot agree, with no law to appeal to, no policeman to appeal to—with nothing to rely upon when their rights are menaced or infringed or when some other nation does wrong, except force in some shape or form.

I do not think it requires any argument to show that we have reached a crisis in international history, and that, unless the civilized nations set to work to establish some better method of conducting the world's affairs than the one we have at present, there is not the slightest chance of peace, prosperity, or stability in human affairs. Every attempt to make the jungle humane, to abolish armaments, to check evil imperialism, to prevent war in this jungle, has failed. There is only one thing left to do, and that is to tame and abolish the jungle itself. If we really want results, we must recognize where the root of the

trouble lies. We must set to work to substitute legal and constitutional methods for our present warlike and lawless method of dealing with that infinite complex of international problems which we discussed in the first conference. We cannot abolish the problems. They are and will remain with us. But we can reform our present preposterous method of trying to deal with them.

C. AFRICA AND ASIA

If we look at the international problems of the modern world we shall see that fundamentally they fall into two categories. There are, first of all, the problems which arise from the contacts between the so-called civilized states. There are, secondly, the problems which spring from the contact between advanced and backward communities. There is, of course, no absolute line of demarcation between the two. They grade imperceptibly into each other. But at bottom they fall into two categories just as do the subjects which are appropriately handled by the central and the local governments in a federation, though the line of demarcation differs in every federation.

To-day I want to discuss the second of these two problems, because it goes to the root of at least half the international difficulties of our time. And broadly it may be said to concern the relations of Europe and North America with Asia and Africa and the islands of the Pacific.

The nature of the problem can best be understood by examining it in its simplest form. What happens when modern civilization touches a backward or

primitive community? Take the case of Swaziland, a native territory of South Africa. When first it emerged into history it was inhabited by a negro tribe living in primitive fashion, in which the women cultivated the fields and the men hunted and fought periodic wars with their neighbors. The government was tribal with a paramount chief exercising some sort of sway assisted by a council of elders. The first contact with modern civilization took the form of an adventurous trader who journeyed to the country and exchanged his beads and blankets for such gold and ivory as the natives had accumulated. He was followed by other traders, with two results. On the one hand the traders began to bring in the deleterious products of civilization, liquor, firearms, and so on, as well as bicycles, clothing, and implements. On the other, the native, having nothing left with which to purchase what he wanted, gave in exchange for them concessions for land, minerals, and so on. It was not very long before Swaziland was utterly ruined. The rulers became debauched. The story is told of how, to the dismay of the trader, the paramount chief experimented with a new repeating rifle on his body guard and laid ten of them low before the rest tumbled to what was going on. The traders and concessions hunters, on the other hand, practically owned the country. The old paramount chief signed on his death bed, in return for a final consignment of gin, a concession "for all those concessions I have not yet given."

These conditions came about, not because the Swazis were not able to govern themselves when left to themselves, but because they were utterly incapable of dealing with the methods and instruments

of modern civilization. Yet it is utterly impossible to isolate backward communities by erecting a ring fence around them. Civilization seeps in through a million different channels, disintegrating and too often demoralizing the primitive community. The most terrible of all its forms was the slave trade, which utterly destroyed Central Africa in order to supply the needs of the civilized world for labor. But the modern forms of industrialism, competitive capitalism, Bolshevik propaganda,—even the missionary and the educationalist,—all have the effect of undermining the primitive fabric of society, in most cases without doing anything to teach the native how to adapt himself to the new conditions and how to control them.

There is only one solution of this problem, and that is that some civilized power should step in and take charge of the situation and protect the people from the deleterious forces of modern civilization, and teach them how to deal with them until they are able to govern themselves in the difficult conditions of the modern world. For instance, in Swaziland, the British Government sent in Mr. George Grey, brother of Sir Edward Grey, the late British foreign secretary, to straighten things out. He did so by cancelling all the concessions and restoring to the natives the lands necessary to their own livelihood and development. He then forbade the alienation of land except with the consent of the British authority, an act which short-sighted people have objected to as an unwarrantable interference with freedom. He then distributed such concessions as he thought compatible with the interests of the Swazis and as were necessary for the development of the resources of

the country among the former concessionaires. And finally he appointed a permanent British Commissioner to supervise the administration of the country and the education and training of the people.

Throughout all Africa south of the Sahara and in certain tropical parts of Asia and Polynesia, in areas containing probably 200,000,000 people, that is the only way in which it is possible for the native to develop or even exist and for the natural resources of the territory to be developed for the benefit of the people themselves and the rest of mankind. There is no other way, as America found in the Philippines when they were left on her hands after the Spanish-American War. And the problem which is going to press itself more and more on the conscience of the civilized world is this: Is this necessary process of tutelage being properly conducted, or not? For, under the guise of tutelage, some terrible crimes have been committed—notably the red rubber atrocities of King Leopold in the Congo, and the evils of the system of the Anglo-French condominium in the New Hebrides. The problem will probably come up in a double form. Are the existing supervising powers doing the work properly, or ought it to be undertaken by more civilized peoples, and is it possible for the League of Nations, through the mandatory provisions of the Covenant or otherwise, to insist that progressive and just conditions be maintained and administered on behalf of all backward peoples?

There is another aspect of the same fundamental problem which to-day is even more insistent: that of the relations between East and West. There are many communities in the world, mostly living in Asia and

North Africa, whose institutions and society have been undermined by modern civilization or who have been brought under the control of some Western power, who now consider that they understand modern ideas sufficiently to stand alone. Indians, Egyptians, Arabs, Filipinos, and others, are all claiming the right of independent self-government free from any interference by a supervising power. China has rightly attempted to stave off intervention by adopting a Western system of government, but she has done so in such a hurry that it is still uncertain whether she can work it successfully. The most striking fact about Asia is that, whereas thirty years ago it was indifferent to the West or acquiesced in its overlordship, to-day its leaders are determined to experiment with two essentially Western ideas, nationality and democracy.

Personally I consider this absolutely healthy. But it is going to produce a colossal series of new problems which will ultimately come up to the most civilized powers to be dealt with. Broadly, they will fall under two main heads. The first will be that of preventing insoluble chaos during the transition from the old system of benevolent external despotism to democratic self-government. Democracy is a much more difficult proposition than most of the leaders of Asia realize. It has taken the Western peoples many centuries of struggle and self-discipline to learn the art of political self-government, and democracy did not obtain a stable foothold on the continent of Europe among the great powers until the third French revolution of 1870. I think it is true that there has never yet been a successful democracy outside the Christian world, and that the most successful

ones have been predominantly Protestant. Democracy is much more than a question of political machinery. It requires an intelligent, educated electorate, a considerable degree of public spirit, and an interest in public affairs in the people, and a readiness to understand, support, and fight, sometimes physically, for the right—for law and for freedom, as against corruption, oppression, and lawlessness. The whole story of democracy is one of struggle and sacrifice for right ideas on the part of large numbers of people. I often wonder whether the dominant religions of Asia—Mohammedanism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism—are capable of giving to their adherents that energy, fidelity to the right, brotherhood, public spirit, and devotion to duty and the rule of law without which democratic institutions simply give rise to a more subtle and veiled form of tyranny.

Experience alone will show how far the Asiatic peoples are yet capable of conducting democracy on modern lines, as they are now bent on doing. My own view is that the right attitude for Western powers which have the responsibility for the government of Asiatic territory to-day is that they should transfer the responsibility for government to the people as rapidly as is compatible with the maintenance of the structure of law and government itself. The immediate effect of transfer to inexperienced hands is always a certain deterioration in purity and efficiency. I do not think that that matters, provided the structure of government and its financial solvency be not destroyed, because experience of the effects of bad government is probably the quickest way of teaching a community that self-government

means that it has to save itself by hard work and self-sacrifice. But once the structure of government disappears in continued anarchy or hopeless financial insolvency, it then becomes impossible for the people themselves, in the modern world, to act or to learn; violence reigns, foreign complications ensue, and some form of benevolent tutelage is the only way in which peace and order and the possibility of progress can be restored.

But there is a second aspect to the problem. Asia will not succeed in learning how to govern itself unless the great Western powers keep their hands off wrongful interference with its affairs. We have seen the results in recent years in China, in Persia, and elsewhere. But, as I have already explained, the real cause of this evil imperialism is not fundamental malignity, but the fact that the so-called civilized West has no means of adjusting its own international affairs save force. Every nation, therefore, looks at every question which arises primarily from the standpoint of its own safety and interest. The United States, for instance—the nation least prone, by reason of its geographical position and its traditions, to be affected by such arguments—has proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, has bought Alaska, has occupied Hawaii, and has intervened in Central America, all because it was determined not to allow any strong power to come within striking reach of itself. And in modern times it has become increasingly preoccupied with the problem of securing for itself the supplies of raw materials and the markets necessary to its own prosperity. If you will consider it, you will find that it has been the necessity for providing for their own security and trade and relative

standing in the world in which there is no unity or reign of law and in which force is the final resort, which has lain at the root of most of the imperialist intervention by the European nations in the affairs of Asia. Take Persia, for instance. Here you had to the north a great military autocracy. To the south you had British India. At the same time Persia itself was being affected by its contact with Western civilization and its stability and strength impaired, a process assisted from time to time by interested parties. Great Britain's paramount interest was to preserve an independent Persia, because it was the best way of preventing the menace to India that would follow the extension of Russian territory down to the Persian Gulf and the establishment of a naval base there. But when the instability in Persia became acute and the consequent rivalry between Great Britain and Russia as to what was going to happen if it did collapse became dangerous, the Anglo-Persian agreement was made. The agreement diminished the probability of a war between two of the greatest world powers in the event of the natural or contrived collapse of Persia, but it also involved a serious interference in the affairs of an independent state, and probably contributed to weaken still further the government of Persia. Yet the necessity for it arose from the fact that, because there is no law in the world, the choice was between interfering with a small nation and standing a world war.

The problem, therefore, of ensuring that the peoples of Asia are to be allowed to work out their own salvation for themselves, once they reach the stage of development where they can maintain a civilized standard of government under modern conditions,

is inseparably mixed up with the larger one we have already discussed—namely, that of finding some better means of providing security and equal economic opportunity of the great civilized powers than they have to-day, and for adjusting disputes between them. Moreover, unless the civilized powers can find some better form of international coöperation than they have to-day, these new problems in Asia and Africa which are coming up to them for settlement will only end, as they have ended in the past, in a fresh crop of international wars.

D. THE PROBLEM OF EUROPE

The Ruhr problem, important as it is, is not the real question which matters in Europe to-day. It is only the effect of two other causes, the breakdown of the Versailles settlement and the inability of the European nations to find any basis for coöperation.

It is the fashion to-day to attribute all the troubles of the time to the peacemakers in Paris. I think that is a mistaken view. I believe that history will conclude that they were ahead of their time. The foundations of the permanent settlements made at Paris were these: The first was that every nationality in Europe should be given self-government, that the frontiers between them should be drawn, as nearly as economic and geographical considerations would permit, to correspond with majority lines, and that protection should be accorded to minorities against oppression. The second was that governments everywhere were to be democratic. The third was that conscription was to be abolished among the enemy powers as the first step to its eventual abolition

everywhere. The fourth was that Germany should pay reparations to the utmost of her capacity, and that a reparations commission was to be appointed to assess Germany's liabilities under the treaty and her capacity to pay. The fifth was that arrangements should be made for uninterrupted communications across Central Europe. The last was that an attempt should be made to get away from the old international system, based upon the balance of armaments, by the creation of a League of Nations to prevent war and to adjust the settlement of international disputes by coöperative means.

Those were the fundamental features of the settlement. I think they were sound. There were many defects in the way they were carried out. The settlement itself was imposed upon Germany by force and practically without any discussion. There were a number of temporary features, such as the occupation of Germany, the provisions about the Saar Valley, and the extravagance of the reparations conditions themselves, which were less satisfactory. But it was inevitable that there should be defects and extreme features in a settlement made immediately after a five years' war, just as there were defects in the behavior of the United States Congress after the Civil War. But I believe that in permanent fundamentals the settlement was sound and created not only a better political system in Europe than it had ever had before, but one which made it possible both to remedy gradually and by peaceful means the mistakes that had been made and to enable Europe to move towards internal unity and lasting peace.

Unfortunately the settlement has broken down. It has broken down for four primary reasons. In the

first place Great Britain, in succumbing to the great reparations illusion, forced up the demands against Germany for reparation to a figure that no expert believed that she could pay. In the second place the withdrawal of the United States nullified the Treaty of Guarantee and emasculated the League of Nations, thereby reviving the terror of Germany in France, and wrecked the machinery of the Reparations Commission and made impossible the reduction of the claims against Germany to reasonable dimensions. In the third place the weakness of the German Government in dealing with its finances and in controlling its industrial magnates, and the determination of those magnates to evade the payment of reparations altogether, destroyed allied confidence in Germany's intention to do her best to fulfil the terms of the peace. And in the last place France, as soon as the complete settlement scheme began to fail, gave full rein to her hatred and fear of Germany and reverted to the traditional European practice of maintaining her own safety by weakening Germany and backing her reparations demands with overwhelming military strength. But, more important than any of these reasons in my judgment, the settlement broke down because it was assumed that the war had changed the nature of the nations themselves and that they had substituted the idea of permanent coöperation for nationalist self-centeredness. Events have proved that this assumption was utterly unwarranted. Since 1919 every nation has gone its own way.

For the time being, therefore, the greater part of the Versailles basis has broken down, and Europe is back again in the jungle, where force is supreme and

right and reason are in a back seat. What, then, now confronts it?

Europe to-day consists of some twenty-five separate sovereign states. Save for the League of Nations, which is half paralyzed by the absence of the United States, Germany, and Russia, it has no unity at all. Every state has to depend upon its own strength, and such order as exists is supplied by the temporarily predominant military power of France and its allies. Now this system, if it continues, must end in another general war. The primary concern of every nation is naturally to maintain such a position in relation to its neighbors that it is not at the mercy of sudden attack. The big powers watch one another's preparations and resources jealously, and armaments steadily rise as each counters what it regards as some increase in the military or economic strength of its neighbors. The smaller powers combine so as to maintain some balance of power with the large, as have the nations of the Little Entente, or make an alliance for protection with one of the large powers, as Belgium has done with France. And so gradually is built up the same kind of military system that existed in Europe before the war, in which the whole continent is an armed camp, depending for its peace on the maintenance of an unstable military equilibrium. Finally some incident or an ambitious, foolish, or wicked group throws a match among the tinder, and the whole house is ablaze, as in 1914.

The only cure for this is that the European peoples should establish some kind of unity among themselves. What Europe really needs is a constitution. For as long as its peoples remain disunited and self-

centered there is no chance of their having peace or prosperity. The difficulties in the way of a European federation are immense. There are the traditions of war and national hatred of centuries. There are differences in race, language, culture, religion. There is Russia now given over to one form of autocracy. There is Italy leaning heavily towards another. Yet the truth remains true, that unless Europe does reach some measure of unity, some collective method of ensuring the security of all its peoples and of settling disputes between them, it is bound to move back towards another general war. And, as the last war showed, if that war does come about, it is bound gradually to engulf the whole of the rest of a disunited world. The position is not yet hopeless. The political frontiers of the new Europe are still intact, the governments are still substantially democratic except in Russia, and it is upon these two foundations that any European unity must rest. Let us hope that when war passion begins to subside and nations have reaped a little more of the bitter results of international hatred and division, wiser counsels will prevail and we shall see progress made towards that unity of the European peoples which is the only solution of Europe's internal troubles.

E. PEACE PLANS OF TO-DAY

We have now considered, in outline at any rate, the practical problems which are manifestly coming up for settlement in the immediate future, and the methods at our disposal for dealing with them. As everyone must agree, these methods—the methods of diplomacy, internationl law, and force—are hope-

lessly inadequate. They have, in fact, kept the world for centuries in a chronic state of local war, supplemented every generation or two by a world war. Though we think we live in a civilized age, wars in which one or more of the great civilized powers were engaged occurred in 1894, 1896, 1899, 1904, 1907, 1911, and finally the grand smash of 1914. And in view of what has happened since 1919, I do not think we have any reason for thinking that we have as yet done anything to end war. What then are the principal proposals for improving our existing international system which hold the field to-day?

The first is the League of Nations. The League of Nations sets out to do two principal things: to bring together the representatives of all the peoples of the earth to sit round a table in order to discuss the problems of our common world, and to establish a means whereby there shall be delay and public enquiry in every international dispute before any of its members resort to war. It has other functions, especially the mandatory ones, but I think these are the two most important. Now, whatever we may think about the terms of the Covenant and Article X, I do not think that any intelligent person can deny that, if we are ever to move towards world peace, the first steps which we must take are precisely these two. Unless all the peoples of the earth are brought together, how are we ever to find out what the needs and views of humanity are as a whole, and so get away from that fundamental vice of our present system which causes every international question to be looked at by every nation from the standpoint of "Where do I come in?" And if we are ever to make any arrangement to stop competitive armaments, the

first step is clearly to ensure collectively that there shall be delay and enquiry before any nation can start a war, for the root of competitive armaments is liability to a sudden blow at the heart. Therefore, in my view, while the League of Nations cannot in itself end war, we are bound to come in time to the universal acceptance by the civilized powers of the two fundamental features of the League, even though the terms of the Covenant be considerably altered.

The second proposal is the World Court. This also is an advance, though not nearly so great as the League. For the essential limitation on any court is that it can deal only with justiciable questions. No court can decide political questions without itself becoming the center of violent political controversy just as legislatures are, and ceasing to be a court of law. The International Court can do much to accustom people to the idea of the judicial decision of international problems, but until it is given a set of treaties or a code of laws covering every international dispute, the real sources of international quarrel will remain beyond its problems. The United States, for instance, would certainly not allow the question of its right to exclude Asiatic immigrants to be taken to the Court for settlement, and every other nation is in the same position about the matters which concern it most vitally.

The third proposal is for general treaties of disarmament to mitigate the horrors of war, such as those signed at Washington. Such arrangements can often be of great temporary service, as they were in the case of the Washington treaties, in tiding over a crisis. But they also have their limitations. They do not deal with the causes of international dispute.

They do not provide a method of settlement alternative to force, when agreement fails. Moreover, any single power in the world can nullify them by beginning to increase its own armaments and so disturbing the balance, for fundamentally the system is only the balance of power in a new and better form. Finally, all proposals for mitigating the horrors of war have failed in the past, because no nation which believes its existence to depend on breaking them will refrain from doing so, while modern invention is so active that there is always a new and more terrible instrument available which is not debarred. As a matter of fact, many of the proposals for limiting slaughter on the battlefield aggravate the killing of women and children behind the lines, as does the blockade.

The fourth proposal is the outlawry of war. The basis of this idea goes very deep. It says that the very essence of our present-day international system—that it is lawful for nations to employ war for the settlement of disputes which will not yield to diplomacy—is wrong, is in fact a violation of the sixth commandment. Its advocates, therefore, propose that war as a method of international settlement should be outlawed by general agreement, and that some other means of a judicial character substituted. The crux of the whole scheme is the last point. War as an institution ought to be forbidden, but war is in its essence no more than a way of settling things—the worst way in the world, but still a way—and the whole difficulty is to find an alternative which nations will agree to work. The proposal to outlaw war, to my mind, is based upon a profound moral truth, but its logic is likely to carry its supporters to conclu-

sions far beyond anything of which they now dream. I fancy that it goes to the root of the whole problem, but we have yet to see the working means by which it is proposed to make it practically effective.

But, in addition to these schemes for international reform, there are two institutions of great practical moment as factors for world peace. The first is the Monroe Doctrine and the second is the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Monroe Doctrine has been an important factor for two reasons. It has prevented the extension of the control of the old European autocracies over the New World; and by protecting the American republics from external intervention it has prevented their own internecine wars from spreading and has made possible both their own experiments in democracy and the experiments which the United States is making, as for example in Cuba, as to the best method of setting a politically backward people on its legs with the minimum amount of interference from the outside.

The British Commonwealth has done much the same for another section of the human race. It contains 450,000,000 people of almost every race, religion, language, and stage of civilization—a quarter of the human race. Some of its peoples are completely self-governing. Others are moving steadily in that direction. Whatever its limitations, the British Commonwealth system does provide a means of adjusting the disputes between the various peoples within it without war, and of making experiments in responsible government among its more backward peoples without revolution. In its modern form it is much more of a working League of Nations than an empire.

We have now covered all the ground. We have seen something of the enormously complex world in which we live and with which all nations are being brought hourly into closer contact. We have seen something of the vast problems in Asia, Africa, and Europe, which are coming towards us and are really already on our doorsteps calling for a solution, if they are not to engulf us in a world war infinitely more terrible and destructive than the last. We have seen something of the agencies which exist to-day for dealing with these international problems and their utter inadequacy, and of the proposals which have been made for dealing with them better in the future.

It must surely be manifest to everybody who has thought about these things that the supreme need of our time is not so much to find the correct solution for the pressing problems of the moment as to improve the international system itself under which we have to handle to-day not only these problems but the endless procession of similar problems which will follow them. In the last few centuries we have made immense progress in bringing order out of chaos in other phases of life, and notably in the art of democratic government. But in the international sphere we have made practically no progress. Thus far, save for the almost abortive effort at Paris in 1919, the ways of the world internationally have been those of the jungle—the naked reliance on force—and to-day all nations are racing back as fast as they can, even from that feeble beginning, to the methods of Bismarck, Napoleon, and Louis XIV.

What stands out, too, most clearly is that there is really no half-way house between the settlement of international problems by force—by war—and the

settlement of them by right, under the reign of law. Our international system to-day is fundamentally a war system, and no mitigations or alleviations will make it otherwise. If we want peace and right to prevail in the world, we must substitute for the present reign of force the reign of just law. Until we do so the nations will continue to pay the price of their selfishness or ignorance in war, in poverty and destruction, as they have in the past.

I have often in this conference expressed the view that all real progress is moral. I am convinced that we shall never bring order out of chaos internationally without a change in our moral outlook on international problems. The moral advance we need to-day is surely the recognition that all men are brethren, that humanity is a single family of nations, and that if we are to be worthy of the name of Christian, we must work out the means whereby the affairs of humanity can be administered from the point of view of what is right and best for the world as a whole. The task of bringing this about is the greatest that has ever been presented to civilized peoples. Its difficulty springs not merely from the self-centeredness of all civilized nations to-day, but still more from the fact that they differ in their standards and ideals. Yet this is clearly the task that the civilized world has to tackle if it is to survive. "Where there is no vision the people perish." I propose in a concluding address to-morrow to say something of the road which I think we have to travel if we are to attain this goal.

II

WORLD LAW AND WORLD PEACE

In this last session I wish to consider something more fundamental than the immediate problems that confront us, or the international machinery which we possess to-day for dealing with them. I want to consider what is the goal towards which we are really moving, and the spirit which we need if we are to reach it.

In the last two years mankind has been deeply moved by the watchword of liberty. The outside world has been moved far more than most Americans realize. Americans have been reared for a century and a half amid the traditions of liberty. They take them for granted. They are part of the political life which they breathe. And when they came to look at the problems of the outside world, in 1914, almost for the first time, they viewed them in the light of their own traditions, and they applied to them the solutions that they were accustomed to find satisfactory at home.

I do not think people always recognize what a tremendous gift America has given to the world in the past few years. The speeches of President Wilson, couched in wonderful English, and embodying many of the most powerful and enduring of American ideals, have literally transformed the thinking of millions of mankind. They came as a fresh wind through the stale corridors of the old world, and swept the shibboleths and cobwebs of the ages aside.

Such ideas as the self-government of all nations, of democracy as the only sound basis for government, of the equal rights of races and peoples—ideas which hardly existed in much of Europe and Asia before the war—are now commonplaces on the lips not of the adults alone, but of the children of the world. And for the same reason the power and authority of the older dogmas have largely gone. Selfish imperialism, political autocracy, militarism with dishonest diplomacy, competitive armaments and all the gamut of evils which follow in their train, if they have not been abolished, are at least now discredited in the public mind and conscience of mankind.

America has good reason to be proud of what it has accomplished for human freedom in the last ten years. Despite the fogs and mists of the time, there is a new spirit in the air, and from it will spring a new world. And the world has good reason to be grateful for what America has done.

But America has helped to accomplish these great results not because she has talked about these truths, but because she has lived them, because through a century and a half of effort and struggle and sacrifice she has proved that it is possible to conduct ordered government on the basis of the freedom which she has now proclaimed to mankind. Her ideals have had behind them the authority not of theory, but of demonstration and experience. And when the final test came four millions of her citizens prepared to lay down their lives to make them endure.

We are now, however, passing away from the phase when the preaching of the watchword of freedom is enough. Liberty has not been the only tradition in American public life. Unity has been a tradi-

tion no less. It is unity that the world needs to-day. And it is because the need for unity has not been understood in recent years, either by America or other nations, that we stand where we are to-day.

In these conferences we have seen something of the leading problems of our time. There are economic problems connected with foreign markets, with the supply of food and raw materials, with the control of the activities of international capitalism. There are problems which spring from the destructive impact of Western civilization on primitive peoples, such as those of Africa, problems requiring the intervention of the civilized states in some form. There are problems arising out of the struggle of the peoples of Asia towards nationality and self-government. There are the problems of Russia and the Ruhr, which now impede the progress of the European peoples towards their natural unity and peace. There is the fundamental problem of national security in a world of independent states, of preventing the measures by which alone that security can at present be attained from rushing us into an imperialist diplomacy and a competition in armaments ending in another world war.

We have seen that, while diplomacy and armaments do adjust the affairs of the world from day to day, they do so at the cost of almost constant war in some corner or other of the globe, and of recurring world wars. We have considered also how far the League of Nations, the World Court, and disarmament can reduce the number of these wars, and the part which the Monroe Doctrine and the modern British Commonwealth system play in preserving the peace of the world. I have endeavored to show

that each and all of these agencies can help, are indeed necessary, if we are to move forward to lasting peace, but that none of them offers the solution of the fundamental problem of world freedom and world peace.

They cannot do so for two reasons. First of all, there is a mechanical reason. The only way in which peace, law, and liberty ever have been or ever will be maintained on the earth's surface is through the machinery of the state. The supreme purpose of the state, indeed, is to substitute the reign of law for the reign of force. It is the only means, because it is *the* means, whereby law is substituted for force. And the state does this not by abolishing force, but by mobilizing it in irresistible degree behind the constitution and the law. In democratic states both law and force are under the control of the people themselves. Peoples have endeavored to find some method of attaining the end of peace and freedom by some less exacting method than the state. They have tried voluntary coöperation and association in every shape and form. But from the days of the tower of Babel they have always failed, and they must fail, for the state itself is the mechanism of peace. The only way, therefore, in which the world will ever get final security for peace and freedom is through the evolution of a world state; that is to say, by the nations uniting under a just constitution which will ensure the freedom, independence, and rights of every people, the laws of which will be amenable to the control of civilized mankind, and which will have whatever machinery is necessary to enable them to deal with those problems of humanity which lie outside national control. Though we shall inevitably pass

through many stages in our progress to this end, eventually we shall reach it.

We seem to be an immense distance from any such attainment to-day. The most civilized powers have not reached the point where they can think in very much higher terms than those of their own national interests. There are wide divergences of race, language, religion, and culture among the civilized powers which make association difficult. There are immense differences in the levels of civilization of the four great continents. I mention the world state, or the federation of the world, as the necessary final solution of the problem of international war, only because it forces us to realize the kind of heroic enterprise which lies ahead before we can finally establish peace, freedom, and progress upon the earth. It is not within the reach of political action to-day.

Advance, however, towards world peace is not a mere question of mechanism. Organization comes second. The spirit comes first. And just as the League of Nations is hanging fire because the spirit of international coöperation has not yet sufficiently touched the great peoples of the world, so the creation of a world state will hang fire until the spirit of human brotherhood and of fidelity to justice and right has spread among civilized peoples to an extent of which we do not dream now.

Throughout this conference I have tried to emphasize that it is the moral factor that has really counted in human progress. It is the moral factor, conscience, the idea that politics ought to be governed by the standard of right versus wrong and not by calculations of self-interest, which is going to help us along

the road towards that world peace of which all mankind now dreams. What is the moral factor which is now missing? What is the evil which prevents our making progress; which, after a heroic movement of liberation like that of the Great War, has pushed almost every nation back into the miserable slough of despond in which we now walk? Is not the evil national selfishness? And is not the moral power which will heal all our diseases an effective love by the nations for all their fellow peoples? I say an effective love, because there is plenty of sentimental love, and it has produced some very remarkable results, notably American works of relief throughout Europe. But the power which does the big things in the world is of a different kind. There was nothing sentimental about George Washington or the framers of the American constitution. There was nothing sentimental about Abraham Lincoln. The spirit which moved them was that which was described by the Founder of Christianity when he said, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

It is this spirit, and this spirit alone, which will bring the world to unity and peace. People sometimes think that economic forces are the real controlling factors in international affairs. I do not dispute their enormous importance. I think politicians and legislatures are inclined to underrate them. The need for bread and butter lies at the root of human activity. But economic factors are not the forces which really cause human progress. You cannot give an instance of a single great accomplishment of the human spirit which has been primarily impelled by economic considerations. Christianity has been the

mightiest force for human freedom and advancement in history, and the whole basis of the Sermon on the Mount is that the Kingdom of Heaven will be established on earth only by obeying moral and spiritual law. I do not think that the two thousand school-teachers who went out to the Philippines to teach the Filipinos and who stayed there, exiled from their homes, were impelled by a purely dollar consideration. I know that the impulse which keeps my fellow countrymen in India and Egypt is not merely an economic consideration. It is certain that the spirit which made the armies of freedom in the late war was not that which calculated the pay and the food and the clothing which enlistment involved. Every soldier, every sailor knows that morale is the power with which victory alone can be won. And true morale rests upon the willingness of the individual to lay down his life, to cease thinking about economic necessities, for the sake of his friends or a great cause.

It is surely obvious that the world can never attain to unity and peace on the basis of the old policy, "Every nation for itself and the devil take the hindmost." Selfish individuals can never conduct a happy home, nor can selfish nations. The world is so small to-day in terms of time and space that the idea that all nations can live in isolation is patently absurd. Economic forces are becoming uncontrollable because the political structure of the world is lagging behind the economic. And the problem of maintaining peace in a world in which every nation has to depend upon force for its own security, upon armaments, strategic frontiers, treaties, and so on, is utterly insoluble. Nations will never have peace, they

will never have prosperity, they will never make steady progress until they make up their minds that they have to live together, to think of one another, and to work for the welfare of humanity as a whole; directly they do this they will find that the problem is far less difficult than it seems to those who think in terms of national selfishness to-day.

But there is more in it than that. It is not just a question of the great nations agreeing to live together in the same international house. They have clearly to gird themselves to take on the onerous responsibility for helping their less fortunate members to attain the blessings they themselves enjoy. There is a bad side to imperialism—I think I need not emphasize that to anyone in this room—but there is also a good side. Your movement across the continent, to Alaska, to Hawaii, to Panama, was imperialism—the spread of a higher standard of civilization and government. Your appearance in the Philippines was imperialism, the imperialism which is the relation of the big brother to the small. What the world needs now is more imperialism of the true kind, for true imperialism is the attempt to bring the blessing of ordered government where freedom and good government there is none. The backward peoples of the earth simply cannot progress without the protection and help of the most advanced peoples. Modern civilization in its impetuous and necessary development of the resources of the earth is too destructive of ancient ways. Protection and help, if possible, ought not to take the form of the civilized powers doing the work of government for the peoples themselves. That method, except in early stages, undermines the moral fiber of the governed. But it ought to take the form of

the maintenance by the civilized powers of the structure of government itself, and of such international order as will protect each people from wrongful interference from outside until such time as they learn, from their own mistakes, how to stand by themselves. I think America established the ideal system in its treatment of Cuba, and it is precisely the method applied there which is needed over much of the rest of the world, but which is only possible where immunity from international complications is assured —an immunity which, in the case of Cuba, is assured by the Monroe Doctrine.

Is it not obvious that this work of protecting and helping the backward peoples wherever it is necessary can be successfully accomplished only if it is undertaken by the most civilized and humane powers? Moreover, it is in assuming responsibility for the common work of the world that the civilized powers themselves will find unity and peace. The outward and visible sign of the moral fiber of a nation is the laws and the structure of government under which it lives. No great people will tolerate a bad constitution or a bad government. The notion that piety and spirituality consist in acquiescence in filth and degeneracy, and the abstraction of thought from the circumstances by which the body is surrounded, is to me absolutely antagonistic to that of Christianity. It is in proportion as we master circumstances and become our true selves, not in proportion as we ignore circumstances and repress ourselves, that real progress is made. Nations which are truly great will refuse to tolerate much longer the conditions of international anarchy, war, and exploitation which exist to-day. If we are the nations we think we are,

we simply must set to work to clean up the lawless chaos, involving the hopeless misery of millions of helpless people, and the chronic war amid which we live to-day. And that means government and law. The purely humanitarian movement, like the pacifist movement, is failing to deal with present-day difficulties. It is failing because it does not deal with the real problem. We talk a great deal about self-government, but the emphasis is usually on the "self" and not on the "government." What the world needs now is not more self-determination, but that government of the nations, by the nations, for the nations should be established on the earth.

When the great nations of the world recognize this truth, I think you will find half the grounds of international dispute dissolve like mist before the summer sun. We quarrel now because we are thinking of ourselves. Coöperation was not difficult between French and Italians, American and British, among half the races of the world, in the Great War, because they were lifted out of themselves and were thinking of how they could best attain a great common end. We are not thinking of attaining any common end to-day, and that is why oil and rubber and markets, and debts and prestige loom so large in our thoughts. We shall forget these things when we really begin to tackle together the stupendous task of bringing the whole world under the reign of just law. And unless we tackle it—and by "we" I mean the most civilized powers—no progress will be made. World peace will not just come of its own accord. But if we do not tackle it, war will certainly come. The responsibility rests fairly and squarely on our shoulders; and if

we fail, and if we sink back into war and chaos, we shall have no one to blame but ourselves.

This task, too, as I see it, has been placed in a special way upon the shoulders of the English-speaking nations in this century—the task of helping mankind to draw up and establish that just world constitution without which it can have neither lasting peace, freedom, nor opportunity. They have the geographical positions, the moral strength, and the wealth for the task. No other peoples seem so well situated to take the lead, though they can and will coöperate; and it seems to me that America, with its high ideals, its great traditions, its immense strength, is inevitably marked out to take a leading part in this work. I cannot believe that God has made you the richest and most powerful of the great Christian states, unless He intends to use you for His own benevolent ends. You have not been blessed in this wonderful way in order that you may just enjoy the pleasures of this world. You certainly have a world mission; and in discovering your mission as a nation, and assuming it, as you will, you will find also that peace for which the heart of America is craving to-day.

But let us be under no illusions. The task of bringing unity and law, and, thereby, peace, to the world will not bring popularity in its train. If the progressive nations of the world assume it, we shall meet with opposition. The war cries of freedom in the past will be cast in our faces. We shall be labelled imperialists and autocrats, and lovers of violence. That is the way of the world when it wishes to resist progress. The sentimental spirit of liberalism alone will never bring unity or peace. George Washington and

Abraham Lincoln were unionists before they were liberals, because they saw that only through union could liberty be preserved. It is something to get the nations of the world around a common table under the name of the League of Nations. It will eliminate prejudice and ignorance. But unless there are some nations sitting around that table who realize that the League is only a means towards the reign of righteousness, and who have the zeal and the determination to make right prevail, the League of Nations will accomplish no more than did the American Confederation in its early years, or the German Confederation until Bismarck dispelled it with blood and iron.

I think people often have a wrong idea about force and the part it plays. They are frightened by the misuse of force into a still more fatal pacifism. Force, of course, can be used, and often is used, for autocratic and immoral purposes. But the use of it still seems inseparable from the reign of law, and to shrink from the use of force in any form is to destroy the reign of law. Anarchy is no less autocratic and no less incompatible with freedom than is tyranny. The reign of law inside the community is not based upon force. It is based upon the active and willing obedience of the citizens themselves, but we all know that without the policeman to enforce the law against that minority which does not respect it, the law, and with it freedom, would disappear.

It is the same with progress. No great forward movement in human history has taken place without some violence. But as I see it that is not because the reform itself has been based upon force—reform is clearly a matter of ideas—but because it could only finally prevail by overcoming the reactionary forces

arrayed against it. Prohibition raises the issue in its most acute form; and it has been proved that if the people of this nation wish to make the moral reform known as prohibition effective, they must enforce the law against those who would defeat it.

It is the same in international affairs. The Monroe Doctrine and the British Commonwealth system are effective agencies for international peace, because there is an effective resolution to support them. No doubt, had humanity been better and wiser the transition to national freedom and democracy in Europe could have been accomplished without the Great War. As it was it required the united armies of most of the civilized nations of the world to overcome the attempt of military autocracy to drive back the onward-moving tides of free government. And that was so because we have not yet learned to maintain sustained force behind international right.

The road towards peace and law and freedom on earth is the road that leads to the establishment of the reign of law over all the nations of the earth. That law will neither be established nor maintained unless the civilized peoples are prepared to give effective support to some kind of world constitution. And the justice of world law and the effectiveness of the police sanction behind it depend upon the growth of that spirit in man which makes him ready to lay down his life for his friends.

So the road is not going to be easy. It is a difficult and an arduous one. It is the old road of national and individual self-sacrifice—the road of the cross. But we need not go out to seek our mission. It is going to be forced upon us. Like Luther in an earlier struggle, we shall be driven to see that, if we are to

be true to ourselves, we can do no less than move forward. We have only to be ready when the call comes. Abraham Lincoln once made the declaration, "It is not possible for this nation to remain half slave and half free." It is no more possible for the world to remain half slave and half free, half in chaos and half under the reign of law. It is going to be all chaos, or all law. And I think it is the spirit of the Pilgrim Fathers, the great New England tradition, which has triumphed, as I see it, in America, even over the fine tradition of Pennsylvania, and which found perhaps its greatest embodiment in Lincoln himself, which beckons to us to-day to go onward and win fresh victories for human unity and human freedom on a still wider stage.

INDEX

Africa and civilization, 89-91, 92; and slavery, 80, 90
Agadir, 85
Alaska and United States, 94, 114
Alsace-Lorraine, 15
American Confederation, 118
Anarchy, 35, 40, 88, 115, 118
Anglo-Persian agreement, 95
Arab nationalism, 92
Arbitration, 54-55, 84
See also Court of International Justice, Permanent; International law.
Armaments, limitation of, and disarmament, 25-26, 52, 60, 64, 71, 87, 97, 101-102, 102-103, 109; impossible under present conditions, 25-26, 86
See also Washington Arms Conference.
Armed preparation, 50, 52, 55, 71, 78, 87, 99, 103, 108, 109; and alliances, 55, 61, 99; burden of, 30, 48-50, 56, 60; French, 98, 99; need of, for security, 50-51, 52, 85, 87, 109, 113
See also Armaments, limitation of, and disarmament; Conscription; Force.
Asia and civilization, 91, 92, 95
Association, 29, 110; and concessions, 31, 38; coöperative, 26-27, 30; object and rules of, 37, 39, 57-58 (*see also* International law); obstacles to, 31-38, 40, 100; uncooperative, 37; for war, 55
See also Coöperation; League of Nations; States, relations of; World state.
Athens, philosophers of, 65

Babel, tower of, 110
Backward peoples, protection of, 86, 87, 88-91, 94, 104, 114-115
Belgium, alliance of, with France, 99
Bentham, Jeremy, 6
Bill of Rights, 79
Bismarck, O. E. L. von, 105, 118
Bolshevism, 53; propaganda of, 90
British Commonwealth, 82, 104, 109, 119; a league of nations, 104
Bryce, Lord, 29; quoted, 29
Buddhist religion, 76, 93

Cannæ, 80
Capitalism, 86, 109
Carthaginians, 77
Chanak, 84
China, languages of, 76; Western government in, 92; and Western interference, 94
Christendom, 80, 117
Christian religion, 7, 76, 106, 112, 112-113; and democracy, 92
Citizenship, 82, 83
Civilization, 34, 80; and backward peoples, 86, 87, 88-90, 91, 114-115; at crossroads, 30, 31, 87; origin of, 27
See also East and West.
Civilizations, early, 77

Colonial expansion, 43, 78
Communications, European, 97
Confucian religion, 76, 93
Congo, rubber atrocities in, 91
Conscription, 29, 96
Coöperation, 62, 65, 96, 98, 111; to aid Europe, 21; and association, 26-27, 29, 30, 39, 110; in war, 116
See also Association.
Court of International Justice, Permanent, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 102, 109; American policy towards, 59, 62; matters to be submitted to, 65, 102; need of code for, 37, 55, 57-58, 102, 119
See also Arbitration.
Cuba, 104, 115

Dark Ages, 77
Declaration of Independence, 79
Democracies, 7, 82, 100; characteristics of, 33-35; passions of, 61, 68
Democracy, definition of, 79, 110; growth of, 80, 96, 105; only basis for government, 108; requirements of, 92-93
Diplomacy, 84, 100, 108, 109
Disarmament. *See* Armaments, limitation of, and disarmament.
Discoveries, modern, 78, 80

East and West, 78, 87, 91-95, 109
Economic forces and international affairs, 9, 78, 112, 113
See also Markets; Raw materials, supply of.
Egypt, British in, 113; early civilization of, 77; nationalism in, 92
Emigration problem, 46
England, financial state of, 11-14; post-war attitude in, 14; sacrifices of, in war, 10-11, 11
English language to be world language, 76
English-speaking nations, world mission of, 117

Force, 50, 100, 103, 105, 113; background of relations today, 85, 94, 95, 106; fear of, motive for peace, 84-85; law a substitute for, 82, 83, 88, 106, 110; prevents submission to arbitration, 56, 61; supporting law, 83, 84, 110, 118, 119
See also Armed preparation; War.
France, armed preparation in, 98, 99; post-war attitude of, 15, 98
See also Reparation; Ruhr, French occupation of.
French revolution of 1870, 92

German Confederation, 118
German language, 76
Germany, changed government of, 17; diplomacy of, towards France, 15; financial transactions of, 19, 98; productivity of, in peace, 50; war guilt of, 4-5, 11, 16
See also Reparation, German.
Goths, 77
Government, 80, 115; duty of, 7, 57; national, 82; necessity for, 78, 114-115; party, 34-35
See also Self-government.
Greek civilization, 77, 80
Grey, Lord, quoted, 27

Grey, George, 90
Guarantee, Treaty of, for France, 98

Harding, Warren G., quoted, 59, 62, 65
Hawaii, 94, 114
Hindu religion, 76, 93
Hughes, Charles Evans, 18
Huns, 77

Immigration problem, 44-45, 47
Imperialism, 90, 91, 92, 94-95, 108, 114-116, 117; American, 91, 94, 114, 115; definition of, 86
See also Backward peoples, protection of.
Indemnity. *See* Reparation, German
India, British in, 113; nationalism in, 92; Russian menace to, 95
Institute of Politics, 3, 25, 29, 32, 65; and public sentiment, 63, 65, 66
International justice, 59, 84; through association, 56; League provision for, 58, 59
See also Arbitration; Court of International Justice, Permanent International law.
International law, 27, 37, 84, 85, 100; need of code of, 37, 55, 57-58, 102, 119; sanction for, 38, 84, 119
International problems analogous to national, 27, 36, 83, 84
International relations. *See* States.
Inventions, modern, 78, 79, 80, 81
Ireland, 5
Isolation, American, 26; British, 20-21; of businesses, 67; of individual, 26, 29; of states, 27, 28, 29, 113
See also States, self-contained.
Israelites, 80
Italy and autocracy, 100

Justice, International. *See* International justice.

Labor, 9-10, 49-50
Languages of the world, 76, 80, 100, 111
Law, 115; backed by force, 83, 84, 110, 118, 119; origin of, 27; sanction for, 37-38; a substitute for force, 82, 83, 88, 106, 110.
See also International law.
League of Nations, 57, 60, 65, 109, 118; and American withdrawal, 59, 62, 98; and backward peoples, 91; Council of, 64, 65; object of, 58, 59, 61, 64, 97, 101-102, 111; and reduction of armaments, 64
League of nations, a, 56
Leopold, King, 91
Liberty, 107, 108, 117
Lincoln, Abraham, 112, 118, 120; quoted, 120
Little Entente, 99
Livy, 44
Lloyd George, David, 84
Louis XIV, 80, 105
Lowell, James Russell, quoted, 33
Luther, Martin, 119

Magna Charta, 79
Marathon, 80
Markets, 9, 20, 47, 78, 87, 94, 109, 116
Mass fear, 32, 63

Medes and Persians, 77
Migration, problems of, 44-45, 46, 47
Migrations, 77
Mohammedan religion, 76, 80, 93
Monroe Doctrine, 94, 104, 109, 115, 119
Moral progress, 79, 80, 81, 106, 111

Napoleon, 80, 105
Napoleonic wars, 5
Nationalism, 30, 43, 92, 95, 96, 108, 109, 116.
See also Self-government.
New Hebrides, Anglo-French condominium in, 91

Pacifism, 118
Panama, 114
Party government, 34-35
Party politics in international affairs, 33, 34, 35, 58
Peace, world, 21, 26, 54, 75, 81, 113, 116-117; agencies of, 58-60, 101-104, 109-110, 110, 119; love and, 112; maintenance of, 58, 97; world law necessary to, 86
Penalties. *See* International law, sanction for.
Persia and Western interference, 94, 95
Persians and Medes, 77
Philip II, 80
Philippines, 91, 114; nationalism in, 92; teachers in, 113
Polynesia and civilization, 91
Population, pressure of, 46, 47; world, 75-77
Prohibition, 119
Propaganda, alien, 43-44
Protestantism and democracy, 93
Public sentiment, 62-63, 65-66, 71

Raw materials, supply of, 78, 87, 94, 109
Red Cross, 79
Reformation, Protestant, 80
Religions of the world, 76, 100, 111
Reparation, German, 11-12, 12-13, 15, 16, 17-18, 67-69, 97, 98
Reparation Commission, 18, 68-69, 97, 98
Roman Empire, dissolution of, 38
Rome, an asylum of refuge, 44; civilization of, 77, 80; overwhelmed by barbarians, 77; philosophers of, 65
Ruhr, French occupation of, 16, 18, 54-55, 67, 75, 96, 109
Russia and autocracy, 82, 95, 100; government of, 82; and Persia, 95; problems of, 109.
See also Bolshevism.
Russian language, 76

Saar Valley, 97
Salamis, 80
Sedan, 15
Self-determination. *See* Self-government.
Self-government, 92, 93-94, 114-115, 116
Self interest, national, 7, 79, 94, 98, 101, 111-112, 113, 114; personal, 6, 27-28.
See also States, integrity of; States, self-contained.
Sermon on the Mount, 79, 113
Slavery, 80, 90
Socratic dialogues, 3
Spanish-American war, 91
States, association of, for war, 55, 61, 99; domestic policies of, 41-42, 43; dominating, 40-41, 53, 63, 65; foreign

policies of, 40, 41, 42-43; integrity and security of, 26, 30, 31, 50-51, 52, 85, 87, 94-96, 100, 109, 113; new, 39; reign of law in, 82-84, 110; relations of, based on force, 85, 94, 95, 106; relationship of, moral or business, 31, 35-36, 48, 54, 66, 67, 70, 71, 81; self-contained, 41-43, 44, 46, 78, 85; treaty concessions between, 31.
See also International law; World state.
Swaziland and civilization, 89, 90-91

Taoist religion, 76
Ten Commandments, 79
Thermopylæ, 80
Thirty Years' War, 80
Thucydides, 55
Tolerance, 79
Tours, battle of, 80
Turks, at Chanak, 84
Tutelage. *See* Backward peoples, protection of.

Unemployment problem, 18-19, 20
United States, 82; and Alaska, 94, 114; and arbitration settlements, 54; and Central American republics, 85, 94; Civil War in, 80, 97; Constitution of, 79; and Cuba, 104, 115; government, duty of, 7; and Great War, 107; and Hawaii, 94, 114; ideals of, and Europe, 107-108; and immigration, 44-45, 102; and imperialism, 91, 94, 114, 115; and Panama, 114; and peace work, 117; and Philippines, 91, 114; policy of, towards League and Court, 59, 62; problems before, 8-9; war of, with Spain, 91; withdrawal from European affairs, 98, 99.
See also Monroe Doctrine.
Unity, need for, 108-109, 118.
See also World state.
Universities and political philosophy, 66

Vandals, 77
Versailles, Treaty of, 25, 49, 61, 96, 97, 98; and League of Nations, 57; new states formed by, 39, 40; principles of, 96-97; and Reparation Commission, 68-69; a victor's peace, 5, 97
Vienna, siege of, 80

War, African and Asiatic tribes in, 29; commercial, 66-67; destructiveness of, 29, 32, 52, 64, 80, 100; the object of alliances hitherto, 55, 61, 99; outlawry of, 103-104; prevention of, 33-34, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 87; and progress, 80, 81, 118-119
War, Great, 33, 56, 80, 112; cooperation in, 116; England in, 10-11; responsibility for, 4-5, 11, 16; United States in, 107; war debts of, 12-14
Wars, 101
Washington, George, 112, 117
Washington Arms Conference, 53, 62, 70, 84, 102
West and East, 78, 87, 91-95, 109
Williamstown. *See* Institute of Politics.
Wilson, Woodrow, 6, 7, 107

Women's rights, 79
World, languages of, 76, 80, 100, 111; population of, 75-77; religions of, 76, 100, 111
World constitution, need for, 99, 110, 117, 119.
See also Association, object and rules of.
World Court. *See* Court of International Justice, Permanent.
World sentiment, 62-63, 65-66, 71
World state, necessity for, 110, 111, 114, 119; non-existent, 84, 87

APR 1 9 Paid
DN 10
MAY 1 3 1980



341.04
B534ap

BIRKENHEAD, F. E. S.
Approaches to world
problems.